Free Trade, Immigrant Workers, and Employment Discrimination by Morrison, Angela D.
Texas A&M University School of Law 
Texas A&M Law Scholarship 
Faculty Scholarship 
12-2018 
Free Trade, Immigrant Workers, and Employment Discrimination 
Angela D. Morrison 
Texas A&M University School of Law, angela.morrison@law.tamu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar 
 Part of the Immigration Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Law and 
Society Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Angela D. Morrison, Free Trade, Immigrant Workers, and Employment Discrimination, 67 U. Kan. L. Rev. 
237 (2018). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1292 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more 
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu. 




Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 grants noncitizen
workers a right to a workplace free from unlawful discrimination, noncit-
izen workers in the United States are vulnerable to unlawful discrimination
because of gaps in enforcement' and a narrative that noncitizen workers
are less deserving of protection than citizen workers.2 This has led to un-
der-enforcement of workplace protections and over-enforcement of immi-
gration laws.3 As a result, noncitizen workers do not enjoy all of the work-
place protections provided them in U.S. domestic law.
Anti-discrimination in employment provisions in Free Trade Agree-
ments are an overlooked source of protection for noncitizen workers in the
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1. See Angela D. Morrison, Executive Estoppel, Equitable Enforcement, and Exploited Immi-
grant Workers, 11 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 295 (2017) [hereinafter Morrison, Executive Estoppel]
(arguing that U.S. agencies' conflicting treatment of unauthorized workers leaves workers vulnerable
to workplace exploitation); Leticia M. Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker
and the Making of the Brown Collar Workplace, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 961, 969 (2006) (arguing that em-
ployers take advantage of under-enforcement of workplace laws and over-enforcement of immigration
laws to cultivate an exploitable workforce); Angela D. Morrison, Duke-ing Out Pattern or Practice
After Wal-Mart: The EEOC as Fist, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 87, 89-90 (2013) [hereinafter EEOC as Fist]
(arguing that a consequence of narrowing the availability of pattern and practice Title VII suits to
private litigants will result in less access to courts for victims of discrimination); and discussion infra
regarding jurisdictional barriers U.S. agencies face in enforcing workplace protections transnationally.
2. See discussion infra Part I.B.
3. See discussion infra Part I.
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United States. Such provisions used creatively by workers and their ad-
vocates provide an opportunity to noncitizen workers to reinforce their
rights under U.S. law by filling in gaps in enforcement, incentivizing U.S.
agencies to enforce anti-discrimination laws, and creating a new narrative
about noncitizen workers.
Both proponents and opponents of including labor provisions in trade
agreements have focused on the impact the provisions will have on work-
ers in developing countries. Proponents of linking trade to labor condi-
tions make two main arguments-both of which focus attention on how
the linkage will impact developing countries. First, some proponents as-
sert that labor provisions in trade agreements will improve the conditions
of workers in developing countries. Scholars and advocates who take this
view have criticized free trade agreements for not doing enough to protect
workers in developing countries.
Second, some proponents of including worker rights in trade agree-
ments argue that ensuring that the United States' trade partners comply
4. Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Leveling the Playing Field: Labor Provisions in CAFTA, 29 FORD-
HAM INT'L L.J. 386, 386, 388 (2006) [hereinafter Pagnattaro, Leveling the Playing Field] ("When the
United States enters into a free trade agreement ('FTA'), it has an opportunity to ... improv[e] inter-
national core labor standards" and "[t]he promotion of fundamental labor ights ... supports the right
of international workers to enjoy the most basic threshold of workplace standards."); Marisa Anne
Pagnattaro, The "Helping Hand" in Trade Agreements: An Analysis of and Proposal for Labor Pro-
visions in U.S. Free Trade Agreements, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 845, 852-56 (2004) [hereinafter Pagnattaro,
Helping Hand]; Justine Nolan & Michael Posner, International Standards to Promote Labor Rights:
The Role ofthe United States Government, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 529, 531-32, 535-37, 541-42
(2000) (arguing that the United States should take the lead in making sure that men and women around
the world have international workplace protections, in part, by linking trade with the United States'
improved labor rights).
5. Deirdre Salsich, International Workers'Rights Enforced Through Free Trade Agreements:
DR-CAFTA and the DOL's Case Against Guatemala, 25 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 19, 26, 32-33 (2012)
(critiquing recent trade agreements DR-CAFTA and NAALC as being ineffective in enforcing inter-
national labor norms in developing countries); Paulette L. Stenzel, The Pursuit ofEquilibrium as the
Eagle Meets the Condor: Supporting Sustainable Development Through Fair Trade, 49 AM. BUS. L.J.
557, 597-605 (2012) (critiquing NAFTA and its side labor agreement for failing to provide job bene-
fits and worker protections for workers in Mexico); see Pagnattaro, Leveling the Playing Field, supra
note 4 (critiquing the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement for three reasons:
(1) free trade agreements only require countries to reasonably enforce their own labor laws and
CAFTA countries' labor standards are not adequate; (2) CAFTA's dispute resolution procedures lack
meaningful enforcement and are ineffective; and (3) there is no funding to ensure that CAFTA's co-
operation and capacity building features will be effective); Edward Gresser, Labor and Environment
in Trade Since NAFTA: Activists Have Achieved Less, and More, Than They Realize, 45 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 491, 502-20 (2010) (arguing that free trade agreements are less effective at enforcing
labor rights than anticipated because more trade is covered by WTO provisions and that leads to cov-
erage exceptions, and there is a mismatch in the justifications for the linkage between trade and labor
rights).
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with similar labor standards to those in the United States protects Ameri-
can workers.6 They believe that lower standards and wages in other coun-
tries result in offshoring, drive down wages, and cost U.S. jobs.7 Thus,
linking labor protections to trade will discourage companies from engag-
ing in a race to the bottom because when developing countries allow com-
panies to exploit their workforce, the countries will face trade sanctions.
Some opponents of including labor provisions in trade agreements ar-
gue that they result in trade barriers that harm workers in developing coun-
tries.8 They conclude that the provisions hurt workers in developing coun-
tries because those workers' labor provide their main competitive
advantage in trade.9 Further, they maintain that fewer limits on trade
would best serve workers in developing countries because trade promotes
economic growth, naturally leading to improved labor conditions.'o
This focus on the provisions as primarily protecting the rights of work-
ers in other countries or as being enforceable only against developing
countries leaves underexplored how the provisions benefit marginalized
workers in the United States. An examination of the labor provisions in
the most recent trade promotion authority and trade agreements demon-
strates that U.S. workers, and in particular, noncitizen workers can benefit
from the agreements. New provisions in free trade agreements that have
enforceable anti-discrimination in employment and regulatory coherence
requirements mean that U.S. agencies must enforce noncitizen workers'
right to be free from employment discrimination, and that their failure to
do so can result in trade sanctions or fines.
Moreover, the anti-discrimination provisions can serve as a frame for
viewing noncitizens' workplace rights as human rights, and the United
States' failure to enforce those rights as a rule of law failure. This re-
framing has the potential to change public opinion and pressure companies
to change their behavior. Accordingly, free trade agreements can reinforce
the rights of noncitizen workers in the United States in three ways: 1) they
6. See, e.g., LABOR ADVISORY COMM. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS & TRADE POL'Y, REPORT ON
THE IMPACTS OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 6 (2015), https:/ustr.gov/sites/default/files/La-
bor-Advisory-Committee-for-Trade-Negotiations-and-Trade-Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/DLZ2-
Q517]; but see Andrew T. Guzman, Trade, Labor, Legitimacy, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 885, 887, 892 &
n.28 (2003) (citing the lack of empirical evidence for such claims and disagreeing with the view that
low labor standards in one country harms workers in importing countries).
7. See, e.g., LABOR ADVISORY COMM. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS & TRADE POL'Y, supra note 6,
at 34, 38, 67-68 (describing perceived effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement and a
race-to-the-bottom that it believes the Trans-Pacific Partnership will exacerbate).
8. Guzman, supra note 6, at 886 & n.6 (summarizing arguments against including labor sanc-
tions in trade agreements and citing sources).
9. Id. at 886 & n.7 (citing Jagdish Bhagwati, Afterword: The Question ofLinkage, 96 AM. J.
INT'L L. 126 (2002)).
10. Id. at 886.
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fill in gaps in enforcement; 2) they incentivize enforcement; and 3) they
reframe noncitizens' workplace rights as a rule of law issue.
This article argues that the anti-discrimination and regulatory cohe-
sion provisions in free trade agreements are an overlooked opportunity for
noncitizen workers to assert their workplace rights. Part I explains why
noncitizen workers are more vulnerable to workplace abuses. In Part II,
the article provides context by looking at the history of worker rights in
trade promotion authority and in more recent free trade agreements, pri-
marily the side labor agreement o the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, and the now defunct Trans Pacific Partnership. Part III argues that
despite some potential challenges in enforcing the anti-discrimination pro-
visions of free trade agreements, trade agreements that include anti-dis-
crimination provisions and regulatory coherence measures will reinforce
the rights of noncitizen workers.
I. NONCITIZEN WORKERS ARE MORE VULNERABLE TO WORKPLACE
ABUSES
Marley Weiss notes that "trade has caused markets for goods and ser-
vices to interpenetrate among countries" and one effect has been the
"movement, lawfully or unlawfully, of workers from one country to an-
other."" And, in the United States, those transnational workers have be-
come increasingly vulnerable to employer exploitation.'2 Noncitizen
workers have suffered pay discrimination based on national origin or gen-
der,'3 unsafe and dangerous working conditions because of their national
11. Marley S. Weiss, International Labor and Employment Law: From Periphery to Core, 25
ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 487, 492 (2010). Most of the complaints brought against the United States
under the North American Free Trade Agreement's labor side agreement involve Mexican workers
alleging the United States has failed to enforce its laws with respect to protecting migrant workers,
freedom of association, and safety and health standards. MARY JANE BOLLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
97-861, NAFTA LABOR SIDE AGREEMENT: LESSONS FOR THE WORKER RIGHTS AND FAST-TRACK
DEBATE 11 (2001).
12. Morrison, Executive Estoppel, supra note 1, at 297, 321; see also Saucedo, supra note 1, at
961-1021.
13. E.g., S. POVERTY L. CTR., CLOSE TO SLAVERY: GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED
STATES 31-33 (2013) (summarizing cases in which temporary noncitizen workers experienced pay
discrimination based on their national origin or gender); MARY BAUER & MONICA RAMIREZ, INJUS-
TICE ON OUR PLATES: IMMIGRANT WOMEN IN THE U.S. FOOD INDUSTRY 22-29 (2010) (summarizing
interviews with noncitizen female workers in the agricultural and meat processing industry).
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origin,14 severe forms of sexual harassment-including sexual assault,"
and retaliation when they try to assert their rights.16
This despite that noncitizen workers enjoy the same protections under
United States anti-discrimination laws as citizen workers.'7  Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating
against noncitizen workers on the basis of sex, race, national origin, color,
or religion." Those protections include prohibitions on subjecting an em-
ployee to a hostile work environment or harassment, disciplining an em-
ployee, terminating an employee, or subjecting an employee to different
terms or conditions of employment.'9 It similarly prohibits employers
14. See, e.g., EEOC v. Global Horizons, Inc. (Global Horizons II), 7 F. Supp. 3d 1053, 1059-
65 (D. Haw. 2014) (granting summary judgment on the EEOC's claims that employer subjected
noncitizen agricultural workers to a hostile work environment and different work conditions due to
their national origin (Thai)); S. POVERTY L. CTR. & ALA. APPLESEED CNT. FOR LAW & JUSTICE, UN-
SAFE AT THESE SPEEDS: ALABAMA'S POULTRY INDUSTRY AND ITS DISPOSABLE WORKERS 39-40
(2013) (describing results of surveys and interviews with workers in the Alabama poultry industry
who reported receiving more dangerous and undesirable work assignments because of their national
origin; workers also reported national origin harassment from coworkers).
15. See, e.g., Sasha Khokha, Silenced By Status, Farm Workers Face Rape, Sexual Abuse, NPR
(Nov. 5, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/11/05/243219199/silenced-by-status-farm-work-
ers-face-rape-sexual-abuse [https://perma.cc/2WC2-C3VJ] (describing sexual assault of female
noncitizen agricultural workers who lacking status were afraid to report); Frontline: Rape on the Night
Shift (PBS television broadcast June 22, 2015), https://www.pbs.org/video/frontline-rape-night-shift/
[https://perma.cc/56CC-TG3Y] (reporting on workplace sexual assaults of female noncitizen custodial
workers); BAUER & RAMIREZ, supra note 13, at 41-47 (summarizing interviews with noncitizen fe-
male workers in the agricultural and meat processing industry).
16. See Global Horizons 11, 7 F. Supp. at 1065-69 (granting summary judgment on the EEOC's
claims that employer retaliated against noncitizen agricultural workers when they complained about
discrimination under Title VII); see also Morrison, Executive Estoppel, supra note 1, at 297, 320-21,
321 nn.177 & 179.
17. Morrison, Executive Estoppel, supra note 1, at 295-96, 302-20 (describing existing work-
place protections for noncitizens under federal law and citing to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1-2000e-1 5 (2012)). Moreover, because interpretations of Title VII "apply
with equal force in the context of age discrimination" and disability discrimination, noncitizen workers
enjoy the same protections under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act. Id. at 302 n.40 (first quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 183 (2009)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); then citing Carparts Distrib. Ctr. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12, 16
(1st Cir. 1994); and then quoting Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer, Co., 984 F. Supp. 891, 913 n.17 (W.D. Pa.
1996)). The only exception is that noncitizen workers do not receive the same protection from the
Immigration Reform and Control Act's (IRCA) unfair immigration-related employment practices. 8
U.S.C.§ 1324b (2012).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1-2000e-15 (2012); Morrison, Executive Estoppel, supra note 1, at
296-97, 303-11 (arguing that federal anti-discrimination statutes extend protection to noncitizen
workers and citing cases and legislative history); see also Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining
the Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1361 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme
Court's decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002), should not
impact unauthorized workers' right to remedy under Title VII).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. An unauthorized employee would not be able to successfully assert a
failure to hire claim. Morrison, Executive Estoppel, supra note 1, at 297, 310-11, 311 n.101 ("[T]he
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from retaliating against noncitizen employees who exercise their rights un-
der Title VII. 2 0 Other federal anti-discrimination statutes protect nonciti-
zen employees from discrimination on the basis of disability or age.21
The reasons for noncitizen workers' vulnerability are complex and in-
volve many factors. This article will discuss two. First, gaps in federal
enforcement of anti-discrimination impact noncitizen workers, especially
those who are unauthorized or hold a temporary or liminal immigration
status. Second, there is little incentive for the federal government to make
a concerted effort to enforce the rights of noncitizen workers, and that,
combined with a view of immigrant workers as less deserving of protec-
tion than other workers, means there is little political will to put pressure
on agencies to enforce anti-discrimination provisions when employers vi-
olate them.
A. Gaps in Enforcement Increase Noncitizen Workers' Vulnerability
There are three gaps in enforcement that leave noncitizen victims of
discrimination unprotected. The first gap results from different agencies'
conflicting treatment of noncitizen workers who experience discrimina-
tion on the job. The second results from the increasingly transnational
nature of companies and their subcontractors; sometimes the United States
lacks the jurisdiction to enforce workplace laws because the bad actors are
outside the country. The third is lack of access to courts for victims of
systemic discrimination as a result of recent Supreme Court decisions.
First, at least three different federal agencies may become involved
when a noncitizen worker experiences employment discrimination: The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In some
instances, one agency such as the EEOC may determine that the employee
is a victim worthy of protection, but another agency such as DHS may
strong protections provided by federal employment law do not mean that employers must hire unau-
thorized workers in the first place. Indeed, to do so would violate [the Immigration Reform & Control
Act's] provisions. Rather, once someone who is unauthorized is already in the workplace, . . . em-
ployers cannot subject their unauthorized employees to an abusive work environment.") (footnote
omitted).
20. Morrison, Executive Estoppel, supra note 1, at 311-15 (arguing that Congress intended fed-
eral anti-retaliation provisions to apply to unauthorized immigrants).
21. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2012) (Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990); 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2012) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967).
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decide to prosecute the worker.2 2 This has resulted in the under-enforce-
ment of anti-discrimination laws because workers have been afraid to
come forward to report.23
A case that noncitizen workers in a Tennessee cheese factory brought
illustrates this gap.24 The employer hired the workers knowing they were
not authorized to work in the United States and that the documents the
workers presented were fake.25 After the workers stopped work because
they said the employer subjected them to a discriminatory workplace and
owed them wages, the employer called the local sheriffs office to have
them arrested.26 The sheriff arrested them and turned them over to DHS.27
Eventually, the workers received a U nonimmigrant visa, a temporary
visa for victims of crime.28 The visa requires that a law enforcement offi-
cial certify that the noncitizen (1) suffered substantial physical or mental
abuse because the noncitizen was the victim of a crime, (2) possesses in-
formation concerning the crime, (3) has been helpful, is being helpful, or
is likely to be helpful in the investigation or prosecution of the crime, and
(4) the crime violated the laws of the United States.2 9 DHS signed off on
the U visa for the workers based on what happened to them at their work-
place.3 0 Nonetheless, DOJ decided to prosecute the workers for using false
22. Morrison, Executive Estoppel, supra note 1, at 295-97, 316-22; Leticia M. Saucedo, Immi-
gration Enforcement Versus Employment Law Enforcement: The Case for Integrated Protections in
the Immigrant Workplace, 38 FORDIHAM URB. L.J. 303 (2010).
23. Morrison, Executive Estoppel, supra note 1, at 295-97, 320-21.
24. Montano-Perez v. Durrett Cheese Sales, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 2d 894 (M.D. Tenn. 2009).
25. United States v. Ramirez, 635 F.3d 249, 257, 260-61 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming the convic-
tion of the company's hiring agent for conspiracy to commit social security fraud, harboring unlawful
immigrants, and perjury).
26. Montano-Perez, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 898.
27. Id. at 898-99.
28. Durrett Cheese Case, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/seeking-justice/case-
docket/juana-montano-p6rez-et-al-v-durrett-cheese-sales-inc [https://perma.cc/3LQK-RTWX] (last
visited Oct. 3, 2018).
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i) (2012 & Supp. 2017). The Department of Labor, the EEOC,
DHS, and DOJ are all defined as law enforcement agencies under the regulations. 8 C.F.R.
§ 214.14(a)(2) (2018). The definition ofcrime is expansive under the statute and includes many crimes
that could also be employment discrimination if they occurred in the workplace: "rape; torture; traf-
ficking; . . . sexual assault; abusive sexual contact; prostitution; sexual exploitation; . . . being held
hostage; peonage; involuntary servitude; slave trade; kidnapping; abduction; unlawful criminal re-
straint; false imprisonment; blackmail; extortion; . . . witness tampering; obstruction of justice; per-
jury; fraud in foreign labor contracting." 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(15)(U)(iii).
30. S. POVERTY L. CTR., supra note 28.
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social security numbers.3' This conflicting treatment of workers by differ-
ent agencies undermines enforcement.3 2 It emboldens employers, like the
one in this case, to view immigrant workers as exploitable because they
can deport or prosecute their way out of the problem.33
Second, the involvement of out-of-country employment recruiters can
lead to gaps in liability and jurisdiction when agencies do litigate, espe-
cially in cases involving H-2A & H-2B workers. In EEOC v. Global Ho-
rizons, Inc., farms in the United States contracted with a recruiting com-
pany that agreed to recruit temporary farm workers for the farms.3 4 The
company recruited workers in Thailand and obtained H-2A35 temporary
work visas for the workers.3 6 The workers were specifically recruited be-
cause of their national origin because the company believed that "Thai
workers would be more compliant and less likely to escape or cause other
problems."3 7 Once the workers arrived in the United States, the company
sent them to several different farms.38 The company withheld their iden-
tification documents, subjected them to uninhabitable living conditions,
31. Monica Mercer, Cases highlight competing interests in immigration policy, TIMES FREE
PRESS (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/news/story/2010/mar/09/cases-highlight-
competing-interests-in/8637/ [https://perma.cc/3ZZK-4CJZ] (reporting that the judge called the case
"the most 'bizarre, Alice-in-Wonderland' scenario he ever has encountered in the world of government
prosecutions").
32. Morrison, Executive Estoppel, supra note 1, at 320-21 (citing cases).
33. See Saucedo, supra note 1, at 968-71. Moreover, it is likely that this conflicting treatment
may increase, given recent reports of the largest workplace raid since the Bush administration. Maria
Sacchetti, ICE raids meatpacking plant in rural Tennessee; 97 immigrants arrested, WASH. POST,
Apr. 6, 2018, at A2 [https://perma.cc/438V-5AYJ]. The raid was conducted on a meatpacking plant
by Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the IRS. Id. They arrested ninety-seven workers
and have not charged the employer. Id. This despite that he IRS Special Agent who filled out the
affidavit for the warrant stated that the plant "hired undocumented workers who were paid in cash and
subject to harsh conditions, including long hours without overtime and exposure to bleach and other
chemicals without protective eyewear." Id.
34. EEOC v. Global Horizons, Inc. (Global Horizons 1), 904 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1081 (D. Haw.
2012).
35. H-2A visas are temporary work visas for agricultural labor. Noncitizens who receive such
visas are tied to the employer who sponsors the visa. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(5)(viii)(B)-(C) (2018). To
petition for a H-2A nonimmigrant visa, the employer must: Offer a job that is of a temporary or sea-
sonal nature; demonstrate that there are not enough U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified, and
available to do the temporary work; and, show that employing H-2A workers will not adversely affect
the wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers. See generally 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(5) (regulations governing filing a petition for H-2A vi-
sas).
36. Global Horizons 1, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 1081 (describing the allegations in the EEOC's Com-
plaint).
37. Global Horizons II, 7 F. Supp. 3d 1053, 1062 (D. Haw. 2014).
38. Id. at 1057.
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provided them insufficient food, and subjected them to physical vio-
lence.3 9 When the workers complained, the company disciplined them,
threatened to transfer them, denied them transportation and food, and
threatened them with deportation or arrest.40
Eventually, some of the workers filed a charge of discrimination with
the EEOC.4 ' The EEOC filed suit against the recruiting company and the
farms at which the company placed the workers.42 The court granted sum-
mary judgment to the EEOC on its claims as to the recruiting company
and one of the farms, and the EEOC settled with the other farms.43
At the same time, the DHS opened an investigation into how the Thai
workers recruited by the company received their H-2A visas and whether
the grant of the H-2A visas was fraudulent.44 DHS ended up referring the
company's CEO, three executives, and two recruiters to the DOJ for crim-
inal prosecution on trafficking and related offenses.45  DOJ obtained in-
dictments, and three of the defendants pled guilty.4 6 Two defendants were
not in the United States, leaving DOJ unable to prosecute all of them.4 7
The transnational aspect of employment recruiting for temporary work vi-
sas, then, means that some of the bad actors can escape prosecution.
In turn, that bad actors can escape prosecution makes workers more
vulnerable because it leaves those bad actors able to continue to exploit
39. Id. at 1060-62, 1063-65.
40. Id. at 1066-69.
41. Id. at 1057.
42. Id. at 1056-57.
43. Id. at 1069; EEOC v. Global Horizons, Inc., No. 11-00257, 2014 WL 7338725, at *31 (D.
Haw. Dec. 19, 2014); Judge Approves $2.4 Million EEOC Settlement with Four Hawaii Farms for
over 500 Thai Farm workers, EEOC (Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/9-
5-14.cfm [https://perma.cc/52QW-LYAP].
44. Lee Davidson, Utah slavery part of big human trafficking case: Thais in Utah case are
linchpins who brought on federal investigation, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Sept. 22, 2010,2:21 PM), http:/ar-
chive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=50301390&itype=CMSID [https://perma.cc/3F9L-QTLH].
45. Id.
46. EEOC v. Global Horizons, Inc., No. 11-00257, 2012 WL 874868, at *1 (D. Haw. Mar. 13,
2012).
47. Id. Subsequently, the three defendants who pled guilty withdrew their guilty pleas, and the
DOJ dismissed all of the indictments. Malia Zimmerman, Exclusive: Global Horizons CEO Speaks
Out About Human Trafficking Allegations - and the Justice Department's Decision to Drop the
Charges, HAW. REPORTER (July 24, 2012), http://www.hawaiireporter.com/exclusive-global-hori-
zons-ceo-speaks-out-about-human-trafficking-allegations-and-the-justice-departments-decision-to-
drop-the-charges/ [https://perma.cc/7HXH-HB5X]. Although the DOJ would not state why it dis-
missed the indictments, in another trafficking case, one of the lead prosecutors had misrepresented
when the trafficking law that formed the basis of the charges went into effect. Id.; AP, Feds dismiss




and discriminate against workers. Indeed, the Southern Poverty Law Cen-
ter has reported that some workers have faced extortion from out-of-coun-
try recruiters who threatened to harm their family members in their home
country if they refuse to pay additional money.48 And because U.S. anti-
discrimination laws do not extend extra-territorially, "foreign recruiters
can openly discriminate against workers eeking temporary visas for em-
ployment in the United States."4 9
Finally, recent Supreme Court decisions have made it more difficult
for noncitizen victims of systemic discrimination to enforce their rights."o
Plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases face challenges in moving
beyond the pleading stage to a trial on the merits," on their ability to prove
a pattern or practice discrimination claim,5 2 and on their ability to receive
class certification.5 3 And increasingly employees cannot even get through
the courtroom door due to employer use of mandatory arbitration
clauses.5 4 These gaps in access to courts exacerbate the vulnerability of
noncitizen workers who already fear coming forward." Inconsistent and
under-enforcement of anti-discrimination laws by federal agencies, juris-
dictional gaps, and procedural barriers have left noncitizen workers more
vulnerable to employer discrimination and exploitation than citizen work-
ers.
B. Anti-immigrant Narrative has Led to Further Marginalization
Demographers Douglas Massey and Karen Pren have described a "La-
tino threat" narrative that presents migrant inflow to the United States as
a "violation of American sovereignty by hostile aliens who were increas-
ingly framed as invaders and criminals."5 6 The narrative developed over
48. S. POVERTY L. CTR., supra note 13, at 10-12.
49. Lance Compa, Migrant Workers in the United States: Connecting Domestic Law with Inter-
national Labor Standards, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211, 223 (2017) (citing Reyes-Gaona v. N. Carolina
Growers Ass'n, 250 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 2001)).
50. Morrison, EEOC as Fist, supra note 1.
51. Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1613 (2011) (looking at impact of the decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), on employment discrimination claims).
52. Morrison, EEOC as Fist, supra note 1.
53. Id. at 89-91, 110-18.
54. See Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to
Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 703-09 (2012) (analyzing the impact the Court's decision in AT&T Mo-
bility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), will have on employment discrimination claims).
55. Morrison, EEOC as Fist, supra note 1, at 143 & n.343.
56. Douglas S. Massey & Karen A. Pren, Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Policy:
Explaining the Post-1965 Surge from Latin America, 38 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 1, 5 (2012).
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decades and was fed by media accounts. This aligns with other scholars'
accounts of the creation of "the criminal alien"-a mistaken perception of
unauthorized workers as criminals." Government enforcement efforts
have played into the narrative; the past two decades have seen a 1144%
rise in immigration-related criminal prosecutions.5 9 The last year has seen
an even greater increase in immigration-related prosecutions, resulting in
a decline in prosecutions for other types of crimes.60 Similarly, stereotypes
based on race and gender about who is a victim and who is a criminal have
also led to an increased perception of noncitizen workers as criminals.6 1
Massey and Pren have tied a rise in the "Latino threat" narrative to an
increase in restrictionist immigration policies within the United States:
15 restrictive immigration bills passed from 1965 to 2010.... [O]ver
time restrictionist bills were passed at an increasingly rapid pace. In the
30 years from 1965 to 1995, for example, only six major immigration
bills were enacted, whereas in the decade from 1996 to 2006, eight pieces
of legislation were signed into law. [There were also] 16 named enforce-
ment operations launched between 1993 and 2010. They typically were
57. Id. Recent examples of the Trump administration perpetuating the Latino threat narrative
abound, despite no factual basis for the administration's claims. See, e.g., Eugene Scott, In reference
to 'animals,' Trump evokes an ugly history of dehumanization, WASH. POST (May 16, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/05/16/trumps-animals-comment-on-undoc-
umented-immigrants-earn-backlash-historical-comparisons/?utmterm=.b9a23b91281b [https://perm
a.cc/S6KL-679G]; Scott Horsley, FACT CHECK: Trump, Illegal Immigration And Crime, NPR (June
22, 2018, 4:49 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/22/622540331/fact-check-trump-illegal-immigra-
tion-and-crime [https:/perma.cc/4XUK-GEMU].
58. Jennifer M. Chac6n, Tensions and Trade-Offs: Protecting Trafficking Victims in the Era of
Immigration Enforcement, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1628-36 (2010). Some labor rights advocates in
arguing against trade agreements also have overstated or misstated the economic impact of immi-
grants particularly unauthorized immigrants-on wages and unemployment rates. E.g., Brian
Mackey, Racing to the Bottom-With the Pedal to the Metal: Re-Thinking, Reviewing, and Revising
NAFTA, 19 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 357, 365-66 (2013). The evidence is mixed on immigrants' impact
on wages and unemployment, but economists do agree that they make a net contribution to the overall
economy. See Wage war: Who are the main economic losers from low-skilled immigration?, THE E
CONOMIST (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21705699-who-are-
main-economic-losers-low-skilled-immigration-wage-war [https://perma.cc/XFT5-3K76]; Eduardo
Porter, The Danger From Low-Skilled Immigrants: Not Having Them, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/business/economy/immigrants-skills-economy-jobs.html
[https://perma.cc/E5NP-5VJZ]; see also Compa, supra note 49, at 216 (summarizing Kati L. Griffith,
U.S. Migrant Worker Law: The Interstices oflmmigration Law and Labor and Employment Law, 31
COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 125, 127-28 (2009)).
59. Criminal Immigration Convictions Drop 20 Percent, TRAC IMMIGRATION, (June 12, 2015),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/392 [https://perma.cc/Z257-LXTE].
60. Stepped Up Illegal-Entry Prosecutions Reduce Those for Other Crimes, TRAC IMMIGRA-
TION (Aug. 6, 2018), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/524 [https://perma.cc/NB25-J3LK].
61. See Morrison, Executive Estoppel, supra note 1, at 297-98 (first citing Chac6n, supra note




announced with great fanfare, including official releases, press confer-
ences, and saturated media coverage. The pace at which such operations
were launched also increased over time. Moreover, they became more
sweeping in scope, covering locations within the United States as well
as along the Mexico-US border.62
The demographers show that this resulted in a policy-feedback that
has led to increasingly restrictive immigration laws.63
Although the restrictionist laws themselves created the new classes of
unauthorized workers,64 public perception persists that the United States
is under threat. That perception results in more restrictions and enforce-
ment. Beth Lyon has argued that legislators' enforcement-only approach
to immigration has resulted in "a series of superficial policy shifts that fail
to address the underlying issues, producing an immigration regime that
seems to be rudderless, offering only unenforceable laws to address vocal
public concern, widespread human suffering, and damage to America's
credibility within the international community."65 Ultimately, gaps in the
enforcement of workplace protections, and over-enforcement of immigra-
tion laws have left noncitizen workers increasingly unprotected in the
workplace.
II. WORKER RIGHTS IN TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY & FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS
In the last three decades, Congress has included worker rights as one
of the negotiating objectives in trade promotion authority. Though the
President negotiates and implements trade agreements with other coun-
tries, the Congress has the authority to enter into the trade agreements.
Since Congress has included worker rights as one of the negotiating ob-
jectives in trade promotion authority, recent free trade agreements have
included provisions guaranteeing worker rights, including anti-discrimi-
nation provisions.
A. Trade Promotion Authority
Because the Constitution grants Congress the authority to enter trade
62. Massey & Pren, supra note 56, at 6.
63. Id. at 6-8.
64. Id.
65. Beth Lyon, The Unsigned United Nations Migrant Worker Rights Convention: An Over-
looked Opportunity to Change the "Brown Collar" Migration Paradigm, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
389, 394 (2010).
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agreements, the President must follow Congressional directives in negoti-
66 Co
ating trade agreements. The Constitution does not specify the Presi-
dent's trade authority, but the Constitution grants the President authority
"to make Treaties" with the advice and consent of the Senate.67 Prior to
the 1930s, the President executed his role in trade policy by negotiating
and implementing "bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce, and naviga-
tion." 68  The President now executes U.S. trade policy as authorized by
statute through the United States Trade Representative (USTR), a cabinet-
level position.6 9
While the President through the USTR negotiates and executes trade
agreements, the Constitution gives Congress the authority to enter into
trade agreements. Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution
designates Congress' role in creating U.S. trade policy: "To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,... To regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States, [and] ... make all Laws which
are necessary and proper" to exercise its authority.70
Until the 1930s, Congress exercised its trade authority by setting tariff
rates on all imported goods.7 ' After Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley
Tariff Act of 1930,72 major U.S. trade partners put into place retaliatory
tariffs, "which severely restricted trade and contributed to the deep and
prolonged effects of the depression."73 As a result, Congress passed the
first trade-related act that "expressly delegated to the President an ex-
panded trade agreements authority o reduce tariffs within congressionally
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
67. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Ian F. Fergusson, Cong. Research Serv., RL33743, Trade Pro-
motion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy 2 (2015) (citing I.M. Destler, Amer-
ican Trade Politics 14 (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics eds., 4th ed. 2005)).
68. FERGUSSON, supra note 67.
69. 19 U.S.C. § 2171(a)-(b) (2012 & Supp. 2017). The Office of the United States Trade Rep-
resentative oversees the United States' trade negotiations with other countries and resolves trade dis-
putes under U.S. trade agreements. About Us, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTA-
TIVE, www.ustr.gov/about-us [https:/perma.cc/UA2C-CK3C](last visited Oct. 4, 2018). The USTR
has "primary responsibility for developing, and for coordinating the implementation of, United States
international trade policy." 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c)(1)(A). The USTR also is the President's principal
trade advisor, "chief representative" of the United States in all international trade negotiations, "prin-
cipal spokes[person] of the President on international trade," and chairperson of the interagency trade
organization. Id. § 2171(c)(1)(B)-(C), (E), (I). Reporting to Congress and the President, issuing and
coordinating policy guidance to other agencies on trade policy, interpreting issues arising "in the ex-
ercise of international trade functions," and assuming any other tasks that the President may direct are
among the USTR's other duties. Id. § 2171(c)(1)(D)-(H), (J).
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
71. FERGUSSON, supra note 67.
72. Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590.




In subsequent decades, Congress reauthorized the President's ability
to cut tariffs through extension Acts.7' The cuts led to a diminished role
in trade policy for tariffs, and "negotiations shifted from bilateral to mul-
tilateral."7 6 Those two changes meant that Congress needed to change fed-
eral law for the United States to effectively negotiate agreements.77 Trade
partners needed to know that Congress would consider agreements within
a definite timeframe, and that negotiated agreements would not be "subject
to unlimited congressional debate and amendment."7' But Congress still
wanted to prevent the President from encroaching on Congressional au-
thority.79
Congress settled on a solution. Through what was called "fast track
authority" and is now called "trade promotion authority," Congress set
four main priorities:
(1) to define trade policy priorities and to have those priorities reflected
in trade agreement negotiating objectives; (2) to ensure that the executive
branch adheres to these objectives by requiring periodic notification and
consultation with Congress; (3) to define the terms, conditions, and pro-
cedures ... under which the respective implementing bills may be ap-
proved; and (4) to reaffirm Congress's overall constitutional authority
over trade by placing limitations on the trade agreements authority.80
Trade promotion authority also presents advantages to the President
because it has an expedited approval process.8
B. Worker Rights in Trade Promotion Authority
The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act
74. Id
75. Id at 3, 21 app. A.
76. Id at 3.
77. Id at 4 (citing Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.)).
78. Id at 4-5.
79. Id at 4.
80. Id at 8-9.
81. LAEL BRAINARD & HAL SHAPIRO, THE BROOKINGS INST., FAST TRACK TRADE PROMOTION
AUTHORITY 3 (2001). First, any qualifying trade agreement entered into pursuant to the authority
must be introduced through an implementing bill in both Congressional chambers. Id Second, the
bill is referred to relevant committees, and there is a minimum period of time that the bill is discharged
if the committee has not reported it out. Id Third, there are no amendments to and limited debate on
the agreement once it hits the floor in each chamber. Id The bill receives an up or down vote. Id
Finally, the bill will not have to go to the conference committee since the bills in each chamber are
identical. Id
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of 2015 is the latest iteration of trade promotion authority.8 2 Its provisions
include significant changes to United States' priorities with respect to
workers' rights. Prior iterations of trade promotion authority required
trade negotiators to ensure parties agreed to "effectively enforce [their] ...
labor laws."83 The 2015 Act builds on that objective to promote regulatory
coherence, to expand what rights the labor laws must recognize, and to
make labor disputes ubject to the same dispute resolutions as other types
of trade disputes.8 4
While prior trade promotion authority included negotiating objectives
related to regulatory practices, the 2015 Act also promotes improved reg-
ulations and regulatory cohesion." It requires negotiators to "establish
consultative mechanisms and seek other commitments, as appropriate, to
improve regulatory practices and promote increased regulatory coher-
ence."86
The 2015 Act also includes two changes with respect o worker rights:
(1) it expands the labor objectives to include the elimination of discrimi-
nation in employment; and (2) it subjects labor disputes to the same dis-
pute mechanisms as other trade disputes.7 First, the 2015 Act adds as a
trade negotiating objective "to promote respect for worker rights . . . con-
sistent with the core labor standards of the [International Labor Organiza-
tion] . . . and an understanding of the relationship between trade and
worker rights."" Section 102(b)(10) requires the United States to ensure
that parties to trade agreements "adopt[] and maintain[] measures imple-
menting . . . core labor standards," and "effectively enforce" their statutes
or regulations implementing those core labor standards.89 The Act's defi-
nition of "core labor standards" mirrors the principles contained in a Dec-
laration of the International Labor Organization:
(A) freedom of association; (B) the effective recognition of the right to
collective bargaining; (C) the elimination of all forms of forced or com-
pulsory labor; (D) the effective abolition of child labor and a prohibition
82. Pub. L. No. 114-26, 129 Stat. 320.
83. Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2102(b)(1 1)(A), 116 Stat. 933, 1000.
84. Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities & Accountability Act of 2015 § 102(b)(7), (10).
85. Compare id. § 102(b)(7) (setting forth the principle negotiating objectives for regulatory
practices), with Trade Act of 2002 § 2102(b)(1 1) (setting out the principle negotiating objectives for
regulatory practices).
86. Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities & Accountability Act of 2015 § 102(b)(7)(C).
87. Compare id. § 102(b)(10) (setting forth the principle negotiating objectives for labor and the
environment), with Trade Act of 2002 § 2102(b)(1 1) (setting out the principle negotiating objectives
for labor and the environment).
88. Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities & Accountability Act of 2015 § 102(a)(6).
89. Id. § 102(b)(10).
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on the worst forms of child labor; and (E) the elimination of discrimina-
tion in respect of employment and occupation.90
Thus, unlike prior iterations of trade promotion authority, the 2015
Act includes all of the international labor standards embodied in the Inter-
national Labor Organization's (ILO) statement of fundamental princi-
ples.9' Using the ILO's labor principles expands the negotiation objectives
beyond ensuring freedom of association, collective bargaining rights, and
the end of child labor, to eliminating employment discrimination.
Second, the 2015 Act requires that complaints about violations of the
workplace rights provisions go through the same dispute mechanisms as
other types of trade disputes. It lists as one of the negotiation objectives
"to ensure that enforceable labor . . . obligations are subject to the same
dispute settlement and remedies as other enforceable obligations under the
agreement. "92
Like prior trade promotion authority, the 2015 Act has sunset provi-
sions.93 The Act allows the President to enter into trade agreements with-
out prior approval by Congress-and subject to the limitations set out in
the 2015 Act-before July 1, 2018.94 The Act provided, however, that the
President could request an extension of the trade authority.95 As long as
90. Id. § 111(7); ILO, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its
Follow-up 7 (adopted June 18, 1998, rev. June 15, 2010). Congress added the phrase "a prohibition
on the worst forms of child labor" to the language of 19 U.S.C. § 4210(7)(D) (2017). Congress also
specifically defined "internationally recognized core labor standards" as "the core labor standards only
as stated in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up."
Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities & Accountability Act of 2015 § 111(17). The 2002 Act also
mirrored some of the ILO labor principles. But the 2002 Act did not include employment discrimina-
tion and had different language with respect to child labor and coerced labor:
The term 'core labor standards' means-(A) the right of association; (B) the right to or-
ganize and bargain collectively; (C) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or com-
pulsory labor; (D) a minimum age for the employment of children; and (E) acceptable con-
ditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety
and health.
Trade Act of 2002 § 2113(6).
91. The ILO is made up of representatives from governments, employers, and unions. Sandra
Polaski, Protecting Labor Rights Through Trade Agreements: An Analytical Guide, 10 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 13, 16-17 (2003). When the ILO adopts a convention, normally, only countries that
have ratified it are bound by the convention. Id. at 17. But if the ILO determines something is a
"fundamental right," then "each member country must observe those rights, regardless of whether its
government has ratified the relevant conventions." Id.
92. Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities & Accountability Act of 2015 § 102(b)(10)(H).
93. Id. § 103.
94. Id. § 103(c)(1)(A)-(B).
95. Id. § 103(c)(1)(B).
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"neither House of Congress adopts an extension disapproval resolution ...
before July 1, 2018," the Act extends the trade authorization through July
1,2021.96 President Trump requested an extension of the trade authority,97
and Congress did not adopt an extension disproval.98 Thus, the President's
ability to enter into trade agreements under the Act is extended through
July 1, 2021.
C. Worker Rights in Free Trade Agreements
In a series of Free Trade Agreements, beginning with the North Amer-
ican Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) 99 and its renegotia-
tion,' to the now-defunct Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP),'' to the pro-
posed U.S.-Canada-Mexico Agreement (USMCA),1 0 2 the United States
has negotiated for labor protections pursuant to trade promotion author-
ity.1 0 3 "Since 1993, the United States has negotiated 13 [free trade agree-
ments] that include 19 countries."104 Only six of the agreements contained
provisions requiring or encouraging party states to eliminate discrimina-
tion with respect to employment.'5 But it is only the most recent agree-
ments that have included enforceable anti-discrimination in employment
96. Id
97. Message from President Donald Trump to the Congress of the United States (Mar. 20,2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/presidential-message-congress-united-states-3/
[https://perma.cc/H3WK-G9YU].
98. See Press Release, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (June 2018),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/june/ustr-lighthizer-wel-
comes-extension [https://perma.cc/DCJ8-L3B3].
99. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Can.-Mex.-U.S., openedfor signature
Sept. 8, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499.
100. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (en-
tered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
101. TPP Full Text, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/
trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [https://perma.cc/
D9GE-7LP2] (last visited Oct. 6, 2018).
102. U.S.-Mex.-Can. Agreement Text, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/
united-states-mexico [https://perma.cc/H5K5-76SD] (last visited Oct. 21, 2018) (the author has also
retained a hard copy of Chapter 23 (Labor Provisions), Chapter 28 (Good Regulatory Practices), and
Chapter 31 (Dispute Settlement) of the draft text of the USMCA).
103. Mary Jane Bolle, Cong. Research Serv., RS22823, Overview of Labor Enforcement Issues
in Free Trade Agreements 2 (2016).
104. Id
105. Id at 3. The U.S.-Jordan Fair Trade Agreement, the U.S.-Chile Fair Trade Agreement, the
U.S.-Singapore Fair Trade Agreement, the U.S.-Australia Fair Trade Agreement, the U.S.-Morocco
Fair Trade Agreement; the U.S.-Bahrain Fair trade Agreement, the U.S.-Oman Fair Trade Agreement,
and CAFTA-DR (between the U.S., Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and
the Dominican Republic) only required signatories to enforce U.S.-defined "internationally recognized
worker rights." Id This standard requires "acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum
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provisions. The NAALC, TPP, and USMCA illustrate the difference in
enforceability. The former, entered into in 1993, has an anti-discrimina-
tion provision but it is not enforceable; the latter two, the TPP concluded
in 2016 and the USMCA negotiated in 2018, have anti-discrimination pro-
visions that are enforceable.
NAALC1 06 is a side agreement to the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA).1 0 7 When the United States signed the NAALC in
1993, it was the first time it had entered into a trade agreement that im-
posed labor obligations on not only the other parties to the agreement, but
also the United States.'0o It also includes a greater number of recognized
labor principles than prior agreements.109
Prior to the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities & Accountabil-
ity Act of 2015, United States trade law had recognized five "internation-
ally recognized worker rights," which included: "(1) the right of associa-
tion; (2) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (3) prohibition of
forced or compulsory labor; (4) a minimum age for employment of chil-
dren; and (5) acceptable conditions for worker rights with respect to min-
imum wages, hours of work, and occupational health and safety.""o The
NAALC expanded the definition of core workers' rights to include work-
ers' compensation, migrant worker protections, freedom from employ-
ment discrimination, and equal pay for men and women."' In this way it
recognized the same fundamental labor rights as the ILO and included the
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health." Id. at 4. Those agreements, then, do not
require signatories to adopt or enforce anti-discrimination laws.
106. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, supra note 99.
107. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 100.
108. BOLLE, supra note 11, at 1.
109. Id. at 3.
110. Id. at 3 n.5.
111. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, art. 49(1)(a)-(k), supra note 99, at
1513-14:
'Labor law' means laws and regulations, or provisions thereof, that are directly related to:
(a) freedom of association and protection of the right to organize; (b)the right to bargain
collectively; (c) the right to strike; (d) prohibition of forced labor; (e) labor protections for
children and young persons; (f) minimum employment standards, such as minimum wages
and overtime pay, covering wage earners, including those not covered by collective agree-
ments; (g) the elimination of employment discrimination on the basis of grounds such as
race, religion, age, sex, or other grounds as determined by each Party's domestic laws; (h)
equal pay for men and women; (i) prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses; (j)
compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses; (k) protection of migrant
workers.
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additional principles of migrant worker protections and workers' compen-
sation. 112
When parties violate their obligations under NAALC, they do not go
through the same dispute resolution process as other trade violations under
NAFTA." 3 To enforce the workers' rights principles, the NAALC relies
mainly on voluntary cooperation and consultation.114 The NAALC only
provides for sanctions when a country violates three principles: labor pro-
tections for children, minimum wage standards, and the prevention of oc-
cupational injuries and illnesses."'
The United States renegotiated NAFTA with Mexico and Canada."6
The administration negotiated with Mexico first and notified Congress on
August 31, 2018 of the agreement pursuant to the 2015 trade promotion
authority."7 Subsequently, Canada and the U.S. agreed that Canada would
join the agreement and the administration announced Canada's inclusion
and a new name for the agreement-the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(USMCA)."' In renegotiating NAFTA, the USTR brought the labor pro-
visions into the core agreement, rather than placing the provisions in a side
agreement. 119 The USMCA also will require parties to "adopt and main-
tain in [their] statutes and regulations, and practices thereunder" the rights
embodied in the ILO's statement of fundamental principles.120 Thus, the
labor rights in the USMCA match those in the Bipartisan Congressional
Trade Priorities & Accountability Act of 2015, and include the "[e]limi-
nation of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation."121
Similarly, the USMCA requires parties to "effectively enforce their labor
laws."122 Finally, the USMCA's labor obligations are subject to the same
dispute settlement mechanism as the other enforceable obligations of US-
MCA.1 23
Although the United States failed to ratify the TPP,124 it provides an
112. BOLLE, supra note 11, at 3 n.5.
113. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Arts. 27-41, supra note 99, at 1509-13.
114. See BOLLE, supra note 11, at 4-7.
115. Id. at 5.
116. U.S.-Mex.-Can. Agreement Text, supra note 102.
117. Ian F. Fergusson & M. Angeles Villarreal, Cong. Research Serv., IF10997, Proposed U.S.-
Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade Agreement (2018).
118. Id.
119. U.S.-Mex.-Can. Agreement Text, supra note 102, at art. 23.
120. Id. at art. 23.3(1).
121. Id. at art. 23.3(1)(d).
122. Id. at art. 23.5(1).
123. Id. at art. 23.14(7). The dispute settlement process is in Chapter 31 of the agreement. Id. at
Arts. 31.1-31.14.
124. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
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example of what a trade agreement under the 2015 trade promotion au-
thority would look like because at the time that the United States negoti-
ated and concluded its negotiations on the TPP, the agreement was subject
to the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities & Accountability Act of
2015. And the TPP provides an example of what the employment discrim-
ination provisions and attendant enforcement mechanisms will look like
in the finalized version of the USMCA.1 25 Since the final negotiated text
of the TPP is available, this article uses the TPP as an exemplar rather than
the USMCA. The USMCA is still in draft form and subject to revisions.
The TPP has a set of obligations and a set of aspirations with respect
to employment discrimination and regulatory coherence. Among the ob-
ligations are that parties shall not "fail to effectively enforce [their] labour
laws through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction in a man-
ner affecting trade or investment."12 6  The TPP requires each party to
"adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations, and practices thereun-
der, . . . the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation."127 A party must ensure that "persons with a recognised in-
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership# [https://perma.cc
/E444-V4CS] (last visited Oct. 6, 2018).
125. As of September 21, 2018, the USMCA negotiations are concluded, but the parties have not
finalized and signed the agreement. The draft version of the agreement is available and its provisions
resemble those in the TPP because the agreement must meet the standards in the 2015 Trade Promotion
Authority (TPA) to go through the TPA's expedited approval procedures. M. ANGELES VILLARREAL
& IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4498 1, NAFTA RENEGOTIATION AND MODERNIZA-
TION 12 (2018). Additionally, Robert Lighthizer, the U.S. Trade Representative, said that the admin-
istration was "building on what was done in T.P.P." Mark Landler & Allen Rappeport, Trump Hails
Revised Nafta Trade Deal, and Sets Up a Showdown With China, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1. 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/us/politics/nafta-deal-trump-canada-mexico.html
[https://perma.cc/Q9CY-9RQ6].
126. TPP Full Text, supra note 101, at art. 19.5(1).
127. Id. at art. 19.3(1)(d). It also requires parties to adopt statutes and regulations of other rights
stated in the ILO, including the freedom of association, collective bargaining rights, elimination of all
forms of forced or compulsory labor, and the effective abolition of child labor and a prohibition on the
worst forms of child labor. Id. at art. 19.3(1)(a)-(c). The USMCA labor chapter differs somewhat
from the TPP because it provides additional provisions on forced or compulsory labor, U.S.-Mex.-
Can. Agreement Draft Text, supra note 102, at art. 23.6, violence against workers, id. at art. 23.7,
migrant workers, id. at art. 23.8, and sex-based discrimination in the workplace, id. at art. 23.9. Re-
garding migrant workers, the USMCA requires that "each Party shall ensure that migrant workers are
protected under its labor laws, whether they are nationals or non-nationals of the Party." Id. at art.
23.8. And regarding sex-based discrimination, the USMCA requires that "each Party shall implement
policies that protect workers against employment discrimination on the basis of sex, including with
regard to pregnancy, sexual harassment, sexual orientation, gender identity, and caregiving responsi-
bilities, provide job-protected leave for birth or adoption of a child and care of family members, and
protect against wage discrimination." Id. at art. 23.9.
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terest under its law ... have appropriate access to impartial and independ-
ent tribunals for the enforcement of the Party's labour laws."128 The pro-
ceedings for the enforcement of labor laws must be "fair, equitable and
transparent."12 9 Individuals involved in the proceedings should have a
right to appeal'30 and access to remedies that ensure the enforcement of
their rights under the country's labor laws.'3 ' Finally, signatory countries
must promote public awareness of the country's labor laws by making in-
formation related to their labor laws publicly available.13 2
Among the TPP's aspirations are the provisions related to regulatory
coherence. Parties shall "endeavor" to achieve regulatory coherence in its
domestic laws.'33 The Agreement encourages parties to bulk up inter-
agency consultation and regulation, so agencies can identify overlap, du-
plication, and "inconsistent requirements across agencies."13 4 And parties'
domestic agencies hould have the ability to "make recommendation for
systemic regulatory improvements."13
The TPP's dispute resolution process for workers' rights differs from
that in NAALC because it was subject to the 2015 Trade Promotion Au-
thority's objectives. So, a party's violations of the Labor provisions are
subject to the same enforcement mechanisms as violations of other trade
provisions. Parties to the TPP may seek enforcement through four main
mechanisms: (1) voluntary cooperation,3 6 (2) transparency and public
128. Id. at art. 19.8(2).
129. Id. at art. 19.8(3).
130. Id. at art. 19.8(5).
131. Id. at art. 19.8(6).
132. Id. at art. 19.8(1).
133. Id. at art. 25.4(1).
134. Id. at art. 25.4(2)(b).
135. Id. at art. 25.4(2)(c).
136. Id. at arts. 19.10, 19.11, 28.2. The Labor article provides for two methods of voluntary
cooperation, one is through general cooperative activities, id. at art. 19.10, and the other is cooperative
labor dialogue, id. at art. 19.11. In the latter, a "Party may request dialogue with another Party on any
matter arising under [the Labor chapter] at any time by delivering a written request to [the other
Party]." Id. at art. 19.11(1). The dialogue is an informal way to work through a matter of non-com-
pliance with another party short of formal consultation or dispute settlement. See id. at art. 19.11. It
can occur while undergoing consultation. Id. at art. 19.15(14). To facilitate cooperation the TPP
requires that parties establish a Labor Council, which serves an advisory and governing function. See
id at art. 19.12. It produces reports and reviews labor provisions. Id. The TPP also requires parties
to designate a contact point, who "facilitate[s] regular communication and coordination between the
[p]arties[,]" reports to the Labor Council, and can "develop and implement specific cooperative activ-
ities bilaterally or plurilaterally." Id. at art. 19.13(2)-(3).
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awareness,3 7 (3) formal consultations,'38 and (4) dispute settlement.3 9
The Labor Chapter also requires parties to allow complaints from non-
parties: "[e]ach party ... shall provide for the receipt and consideration of
written submissions from persons of a Party on matters related to [labor
matters under the TPP] in accordance with its domestic procedures."40
When a party receives a submission, it must consider the merits of the
submission and provide a timely response.141 It must also make the sub-
mission and the party's response to it public, as appropriate.14 2
III. DESPITE POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO ENFORCEMENT, THE ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION PROVISION WILL REINFORCE THE WORKPLACE
RIGHTS OF NONCITIZEN WORKERS
Provisions in free trade agreements-the requirement that a party en-
forces its anti-discrimination laws, the regulatory coherence provisions,
the public submission process, and the dispute settlement provisions-
have the potential to reinforce the rights of noncitizen workers in the
137. Id at arts. 19.8 (public awareness guarantees), 19.9(3)(b) (make submissions under the
agreement public, as appropriate), 19.10(2)(g) (transparency and public participation in cooperative
efforts under the agreement), 19.12(7) (Labour Council decisions and reports should be publicly avail-
able), 19.13(2)(d) (contact point acts as channel for communication with the public in the party's ter-
ritory), 19.14(2) (parties should maintain a national labor advisory body to allow for public engage-
ment in labor issues under the TPP), 28.17 (the disputing parties must release the final report generated
from the dispute settlement panel to the public).
138. Id. at arts. 19.15, 28.5.
139. Id. at arts. 19.12-19.13, 28.7-28.21. Before parties may submit their dispute to a panel, the
parties must first engage in formal consultation. Id. at arts. 19.13, 28.7. The USMCA's dispute reso-
lution procedures resemble those in the TPP. U.S.-Mex.-Can. Agreement Text, supra note 102, at art.
31. Because the regulatory cohesion provisions in the TPP are only aspirational, the only enforcement
mechanisms available for violations of the regulatory cohesion provisions are voluntary cooperation
and transparency. TPP Full Text, supra note 101, at art. 25.11 ("No party shall have recourse to dispute
settlement under Chapter 28 (Dispute Settlement) for any matter arising under this Chapter [Regula-
tory Coherence]."). The chapter on Regulatory Coherence provides for a Committee on Regulatory
Coherence, id. at art. 25.6, and cooperation "to facilitate the implementation of [Regulatory Coher-
ence]", id. at art. 25.7(1). Chapter 25 also includes transparency measures. Id. at arts. 25.4(2)(d)
(parties should "publicly report on regulatory measures reviewed, an[d] proposals for systemic regu-
latory improvements"), 25.5(5) (parties should ensure public access to information on regulatory
measures), 25.8 (parties should provide ways for interested person to provide input on the parties'
regulatory coherence). The USCMA, however, allows parties to use the dispute settlement process
for regulatory coherence violations in limited circumstances: "No Party shall have recourse for dispute
settlement . . . for a matter arising under [the Good Regulatory Practices chapter] except to address a
sustained and recurring course of action or inaction that is inconsistent with a provision of [the Good
Regulatory Practices chapter]." U.S.-Mex.-Can. Agreement Text, supra note 102, at art. 28.20(3).
140. TPP Full Text, supra note 101, at art. 19.9(1).
141. Id. at arts. 19.9(2)(c) & 19.9(3)(a).
142. Id. at art. 19.9(3)(b).
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United States. However, the provisions also present challenges to enforce-
ment. Free trade agreements do not provide a private right of action, a
violation must be in a manner affecting trade, and the enforcement mech-
anisms are not efficient. Nonetheless, the agreements will still reinforce
noncitizens' employment rights in three important ways. First, they will
fill in gaps in U.S. enforcement; second, they will provide additional in-
centives to the United States to enforce its anti-discrimination provisions;
and third, they provide a frame that will result in political pressure on the
U.S. government and employers to respect the rule of law and noncitizen
workers' rights.
A. Potential Challenges to Enforcement
Although free trade agreements strive to eliminate discrimination in
employment and create an obligation on the part of member states to ef-
fectively enforce their own labor laws, workers and their advocates will
face several challenges in using the provisions to enforce their rights.
First, trade agreements do not create a private right of action, which means
individuals have to rely on a member state to bring a complaint. Second,
the party must fail to enforce its labor laws in a manner affecting trade
between the parties. Third, the enforcement mechanisms could be inef-
fective. Finally, only member states are subject to the provisions.
The initial challenge to enforcement is that trade agreements do not
generally create a private right of action. NAALC, the TPP, and USMCA
are no exception.143 All three agreements specifically forbid parties to the
agreement from providing a private right of action under their domestic
laws.144 Although the NAALC, the TPP, and the USMCA require parties
to allow submissions to their trade authorities from non-parties, the trade
authorities do not have to act on those submissions other than to generate
a report.145  As a result, only parties may seek enforcement of the anti-
discrimination provisions under the trade agreement, and they may only
143. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, art. 43, supra note 99, at 1513; U.S.-
Mex.-Can. Agreement Text, supra note 102, at art. 31.21; TPP Full Text, supra note 101, at art. 28.22.
144. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, art. 43, supra note 99, at 1513 ("No
Party may provide for a right of action under its domestic law against any other Party on the ground
that another Party has acted in a manner inconsistent with this Agreement."); U.S.-Mex.-Can. Agree-
ment Text, supra note 102, at art. 31.21 ("No Party shall provide for a right of action under its law
against another Party on the ground that a measure of that other Party is inconsistent with this Agree-
ment."); TPP Full Text, supra note 101, at art. 28.22 ("No Party shall provide for a right of action
under its law against any other Party on the ground that a measure of that other Party is inconsistent
with its obligations under this Agreement, or that the other Party has otherwise failed to carry out its
obligations under this Agreement.").
145. See, e.g., TPP Full Text, supra note 101, at art. 19.9(1)-(3).
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seek enforcement against another party to the agreement.146 That means
noncitizen workers in the United States who believe that the United States
has failed to effectively enforce its anti-discrimination law, have to rely on
another signatory state to the agreement to seek enforcement. It also
means that the workers, themselves, do not have individual remedies under
the agreement.
That workers will have to rely on another member state to enforce the
provision presents disadvantages to three specific groups of noncitizens.
First, noncitizens who are in the United States as refugees or asylees will
not be able to rely on their country of origin to enforce the provision, and
they may have a more difficult time getting another state to bring the en-
forcement action. Asylees and refugees are in the United States because
they are "unable or unwilling to return to . . . [their] country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion."14 7 Further, the refugee or asylee must show that she is "unable
or unwilling to avail [herself]" of the country's protection.148 Because the
country itself allowed or perpetrated the persecution, this makes it unlikely
that the country would respond to an asylee or refugee's submission.
A second group may have a difficult time getting a member state to
seek enforcement because the noncitizens' country of origin is not a mem-
ber state of the agreement. In 2016, China sent he second largest number
of immigrants to the United States, India sent he third largest number, and
the Philippines sent the fourth largest.14 9 None of those countries have
entered into a trade agreement with the United States."0 This means that
noncitizens from non-member states would have to lobby a member state,
with which they have no connection, to file a submission. For this group
and for asylees, it will likely be difficult for them to rely on a country
different from their country of origin. They will be expected to figure out
that country's procedures for filing a submission. And it could prove dif-
ficult to get attention from that country's trade authority if they are unfa-
miliar with that country's cultural norms and what would be most persua-
sive to the country's trade authority.
146. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, art. 43, supra note 99, at 1513; U.S.-
Mex.-Can. Agreement Text, supra note 102, at art. 31.21; TPP Full Text, supra note 101, at art. 28.22.
147. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
148. Id.
149. Gustavo L6pez & Kristen Bialik,Key findings about US. immigrants, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept.
14, 2018), http://pewrsr.ch/2qz2zvx [https://perma.cc/A4LJ-34VY].
150. Free Trade Agreements, INT'L TRADE ADMIN., https://www.trade.gov/fta/ [https://per
ma.cc/4BKQ-FZBW] (last visited Oct. 6, 2018).
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The third group that may have a difficult time getting a member state
to seek enforcement are those who have lived in the United States for such
an extended period of time that they have few ties to their country of
origin. For example, individuals who were brought to the United States as
children and grew up in the United States, often more closely identify with
United States' culture than the culture of their country of origin.' Noncit-
izens with more extensive ties to the United States than to their country of
origin may face challenges similar to noncitizens who must rely on a coun-
try different from their country of origin.
A second challenge to enforcement of the anti-discrimination
measures is that the United States must fail to effectively enforce its laws
"in a manner affecting trade or investment between the Parties."152 A re-
cent case that went to arbitration under the Dominican Republic-Central
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR),'53 illustrates the diffi-
culty workers may have in demonstrating that the United States failed to
effectively enforce its labor laws in a manner affecting trade and develop-
ment.5 4 American and Guatemalan trade unions filed a submission with
the United States that alleged Guatemala failed to enforce its labor laws
with respect to collective bargaining and organization rights, freedom of
association, and acceptable conditions of work."' The United States is-
sued a final report in which it sustained the allegations in the submission
and requested a formal consultation.5 6 After the formal consultation was
151. See, e.g., Maria Sacchetti & Perry Stein, 'We are America': DACA recipients, supporters
say they are not going anywhere, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2017) [https://perma.cc/Z5UJ-BJKK] (de-
scribing DACA recipients' view of themselves as American).
152. TPP Full Text, supra note 101, at art. 19.5(1).
153. CAFTA-DR Final Text, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-amer-
ica-fta/final-text [https:/perma.cc/94HH-Z8UZ]. CAFTA-DR included some enforceable labor rights
provisions:
labor laws means a Party's statutes or egulations, or provisions thereof, that are directly
related to the following internationally recognized labor rights: (a) the right of association;
(b) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (c) a prohibition on the use of any form
of forced or compulsory labor; (d) a minimum age for the employment of children and the
prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labor; and (e) acceptable condi-
tions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and
health.
Id. at art. 16.8. Unlike the NAALC or agreements negotiated under the 2015 Trade Promotion Act, it
does not include anti-discrimination in employment provisions.
154. Lance Compa et al., Wrong Turn for Workers' Rights: The U.S.-Guatemala CAFTA Labor
Arbitration Ruling - And What to Do About It (2018).




unsuccessful in resolving the dispute, the United States requested arbitra-
tion under the dispute settlement mechanisms of the agreement. ' 7  Alt-
hough the panel found that Guatemala had failed to effectively enforce its
labor laws, it rejected the United States' claims, in part, because Guate-
mala's failure was not in a manner that affected trade between the par-
ties.5 8
The United States had alleged that Guatemala's failure to enforce its
laws affected trade because employers were able "to evade or forego ...
costs associated with having a functioning union or a collective labor
agreement in the workplace."15 9 It was the cost-savings that employers
enjoyed in Guatemala that allowed them to gain a competitive ad-
vantage.160 The panel adopted a definition of "in a manner affecting trade
between the Parties" that followed the United States' reasoning: "a failure
to effectively enforce a Party's labor laws ... is 'in a manner affecting
trade between the Parties' if it confers some competitive advantage on an
employer or employers engaged in trade between the Parties."161 Under
that definition, the panel found the employers in Guatemala did not expe-
rience enough cost savings to have gained a competitive advantage.16 2
If future panels adopt the same definition, the United States likely does
not violate the trade agreement when it fails to enforce the rights of noncit-
izen workers in industries that do not affect trade or development.163 At
least 48% of unauthorized workers are employed in industries that likely
157. Id
158. Id. at 16-17.
159. Id. at 17 (alteration in original) (excerpting and annotating arbitral decision).
160. Id
161. Id at 11.
162. Id at 17-20. The panel did find that one employer may have gained a competitive advantage
but determined that the United States had not presented enough evidence to support a finding that it
was a sustained or recurring course of action. Id. at 21.
163. The draft version of the USMCA includes clarifying language for the term. U.S.-Mex.-Can.
Agreement Text, supra note 102, at art. 31 nn. 11, 12. Note 11 states the following, a "'sustained or
recurring course of action or inaction' is 'sustained' where the course of action or inaction occurs
periodically or repeatedly and when the occurrences are related or the same in nature. A course of
action or inaction does not include an isolated instance or case." Id. at art. 31, n. 11. Note 12 clarifies
when the action or inaction is "in a manner affecting trade or investment between the Parties":
For greater certainty, a "course of action or inaction" is "in a manner affecting trade or
investment between the Parties" where the course involves: (1) a person or industry that
produces goods or provides services traded between the Parties or has investment in the
territory of the Party that has failed to comply with this obligation; or (2) a person or in-
dustry that produces goods or provides services that compete in the territory of a Party with
goods or services of another Party.
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do not affect trade-the service industry and construction;164 at least 18%
of authorized immigrants work in jobs that likely do not affect trade or
industry-retail and educational services.165 For workers in those kinds of
industries, then, free trade agreements will not be as effective as a tool for
specific enforcement of their workplace rights.
A third challenge is in the enforcement mechanism itself, and in the
lack of enforcement mechanisms for the regulatory coherence measures.
Free trade agreements seek cooperation between parties; as a result, much
of the dispute resolution process is focused on voluntary compliance and
cooperation.166 Indeed, as described above, parties must engage in con-
sultation before engaging in the dispute settlement process.167 As the ex-
perience with the consultation process under the NAALC demonstrates,
the process can take years. For example, the most recent submission
against the United States took one year for Mexico to issue its initial re-
port, and then another year and a half for the parties to consult and issue a
joint declaration.168
If a complaining party needs dispute settlement to enforce the anti-
discrimination provision against the United States, the process will result
in even more time before the complaining party receives a resolution.
First, under the TPP's dispute settlement provisions, the non-conforming
party has several options to challenge the dispute settlement panel's deter-
mination of non-conformity.169 Further, a non-compliant party has a "rea-
sonable period of time" in which to correct the non-conformity.170 This
means that although the TPP has time limits set for the dispute settlement
process-the Panel must issue its initial report within 150 days and its final
report within thirty days of the initial report ' 7 '-the dispute settlement pro-
cess has the potential to drag on much longer than the time limits would
suggest. Accordingly, one challenge posed by the enforcement mecha-
nisms is the length of time it will take to resolve any non-conformities with
164. Jeffrey S. Passel & D'Vera Cohn, 2. Occupations of unauthorized immigrant workers, PEW
RES. CTR. (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/11/03/occupations-of-unauthorized-im-
migrant-workers/ [https://perma.cc/NG2T-4T6X].
165. Drew DeSilver, Immigrants don't make up a majority of workers in any U.S. Industry, PEW
RES. CTR. (Mar. 16, 2017), http://pewrsr.ch/2n30g4n [https://perma.cc/39ZU-G7WJ].
166. TPP Full Text, supra note 101, at arts. 19.10-19.15, 28.2, 28.5-28.6.
167. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
168. Mex. NAO 2011-1, H2-B Visa Workers (2011), https://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agree-
ments/naalc.htm [https://perma.cc/PH4T-9EU5] (type "h2" in search bar; then click on 201 IMexico
Submission 2011-1 (H-2BVisa Workers)" entry).
169. TPP Full Text, supra note 101, at arts. 28.19-28.20.
170. Id. at art. 28.19(3).




Similarly, the lack of enforcement mechanisms for the regulatory co-
herence measures could prove a challenge to effecting the anti-discrimi-
nation provisions. One of the primary criticisms of NAALC is that it does
not subject most worker rights violation to fines or sanctions.172 Critics
say that the lack of fines or sanctions mean that countries are less likely to
engage in consultations in the first place.173 And critics argue that consul-
tations themselves do not provide "a sufficient incentive to deter" coun-
tries from violating their own worker rights laws.174 Thus, voluntary co-
operation alone may not be enough incentive for the United States to
ensure regulatory cohesion with respect o its anti-discrimination laws.175
Finally, a shortcoming of trade agreements is that only governments
are parties to the agreement, and so only governments are subject to sanc-
tions or fines.17 6 This creates a misalignment in interests between govern-
ments and employers. '7 Since governments bear the consequences of an
employer's failure to comply with anti-discrimination provisions, employ-
ers lack an incentive to comply with the trade provisions.17
B. Opportunities to Reinforce Noncitizen Workers' Rights
Despite the challenges to enforcement, the non-discrimination provi-
sions in trade agreements present an opportunity to reinforce noncitizen
workers' rights in three ways. First, to fully comply with the agreements
the United States will need to engage in more consistent enforcement of
workplace rights. At the same time, the agreements will allow the United
States to seek better enforcement of workplace laws across transnational
jurisdictions. Second, the United States' trading partners will be moti-
vated to ensure the United States complies with its obligations under the
agreements. Accordingly, the United States will have additional incen-
172. Laura Okin Pomeroy, Note, The Labor Side Agreement Under the NAFTA: Analysis of its
Failure to Include Strong Enforcement Provisions and Recommendations for Future Labor Agree-
ments Negotiated with Developing Countries, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 769, 791-94
(1996).
173. Id. at 791-93.
174. Id. at 792.
175. Of course, if the draft language allowing recourse to dispute settlement in the USMCA's
Good Regulatory Practices chapter remains, then a party would be able to enforce the regulatory co-
hesion obligations against a party that engages in "a sustained and recurring course of action or inac-
tion that is inconsistent with a provision of [the Good Regulatory Practices chapter]." U.S.-Mex.-Can.
Agreement Draft Text, supra note 102, at art. 28.20(3).
176. Polaski, supra note 91, at 22-23.
177. Id. at 23.
178. Id.
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tives to comply or face fines and sanctions. Finally, the agreements pro-
vide a tool for workers and their advocates to apply pressure to U.S. agen-
cies to better enforce workplace rights and to organize campaigns that
pressure employers to change discriminatory practices.
1. Fill in Gaps in U.S. Agency Enforcement of Workplace Rights
The anti-discrimination provisions in trade agreements provide an op-
portunity to fill in gaps in U.S. agency enforcement of workplace rights.
The regulatory coherence and effective enforcement of labor laws provi-
sions mean that to comply with the agreements, U.S. agencies need to bet-
ter coordinate their enforcement of workplace rights and immigration law.
The United States can file complaints against other member states when
those states fail to enforce their labor laws, potentially filling in some of
the jurisdictional gaps that U.S. agencies face when transnational compa-
nies or individuals are involved. Further, the provisions should encourage
U.S. agencies, such as the EEOC, to take on cases involving noncitizen
workers, providing better access to courts for those workers.
The United States' enforcement of its anti-discrimination laws with
respect to noncitizen workers shows gaps in enforcement due to conflict-
ing action by the agencies that enforce the laws.17 9 The anti-discrimination
and regulatory coherence measures in trade agreement provide an oppor-
tunity for the United States to fill that gap in protection. As described
above, trade agreements negotiated pursuant to the 2015 Trade Promotion
authority must provide that a party effectively enforce its own labor
laws.s0 A violation must be through a "sustained or recurring course of
action or inaction in a manner affecting trade or investment."'' Similarly,
parties should endeavor to achieve "regulatory coherence" in their domes-
tic laws.'82 Part of regulatory coherence is "prevent[ing] the creation of
inconsistent requirements across agencies."18 3
A submission under NAALC illustrates some of the results these pro-
visions could achieve. The submittal complained that the United States
failed to enforce its own labor laws-specifically, its existing minimum
wage and overtime protections in workplaces employing noncitizens.'84
179. See discussion supra Part I.A.
180. TPP Full Text, supra note 101, at art. 19.5.
181. Id. at art. 19.5(1).
182. Id. at art. 25.4(1).
183. Id. at art. 25.4(2)(b).
184. Petition on Labor Law Matters Arising in the United States submitted to the National Ad-
ministrative Office (NAO) of Mexico under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
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The submission attributed the failure to a Memorandum of Understanding
between the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) and the legacy Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) that required the two agencies to share
information and required the DOL to engage in enforcement procedures.'
Prior to Mexico considering the submission, DOL and INS revised the
Memorandum of Understanding to ensure that immigration enforcement
functions do not conflict with worker protection functions.8 6 Mexico is-
sued a report and requested consultation under the NAALC.1 7  A joint
declaration resulted in which Mexico and the United States agreed to col-
laborate on efforts to promote noncitizen workers' rights in the United
States, and in which the DOL agreed to develop materials about noncitizen
workers' rights." This case, then, is an example of how workers' rights
provisions in a trade agreement can lead to increased regulatory cohesion
in the enforcement of domestic labor laws-even in the absence of a robust
enforcement mechanism in the trade agreement. The nd result was rein-
forcement of noncitizens' workplace rights.
This example also shows why the United States should work on its
efforts towards regulatory coherence because where there are enforcement
mechanisms, the United States will face fines and sanctions for failing to
effectively enforce its anti-discrimination laws. This could encourage fed-
eral agencies to engage in more efforts to collaborate between agencies.'89
(NAALC), Mex. NAO 9804, at 1-5 (Sept. 17, 1998), https://www.dol.gov/ilab/submissions/
pdf/mx 9804 yalesubmission.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8VN-F9Y4] [hereinafter 1998 NAALC Peti-
tion].
185. Id. at 3-5.
186. Mex. NAO 9804, Yale/INS (1998), U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/ilab/
trade/agreements/naalc.htm [https:/perma.cc/6X4T-F2NG] (type "Yale/INS" in search bar; then click
"Mexico NAO Submission 9804 (Yale/INS)" entry).
187. Id.
188. Ministerial Consultations Joint Declaration Between the Department of Labor of the United
States of America and the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare of the United Mexican States Con-
cerning U.S. NAO Public Communications 9901 and 2000-0 1, and Mexican NAO Public Communi-
cation 9804, Mex. NAO 9804, (June 11, 2002), https://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/
jointdeclar061102.htm [https://perma.cc/4GMB-T89S].
189. Although individual states in the United States are not considered a party to the United
States' trade agreements and their laws are not considered U.S. domestic law under the agreements,
federal workplace employment agencies should also consider establishing cooperative working groups
with related state agencies. Some agencies already do this to a certain extent, but more cooperation
could lead to better enforcement. For example, the EEOC cooperates with state fair employment
agencies to coordinate enforcement of federal and state anti-discrimination in employment laws.
EEOC, Fair Employment Practices Agencies (FEPAs) and Dual Filing (last visited Oct. 6, 2018),
https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/fepa.cfm [https:/perma.cc/C484-7HXE]. Trafficking task forces in
various jurisdictions represent a type of cooperative model that involves local and federal law enforce-
ment and non-governmental organizations. In some instances, such groups have been instrumental in
achieving better enforcement of trafficking laws. Departments of Justice, Labor and Homeland Se-
curity Announce Phase II ofAnti-Trafficking Coordination Team Initiative, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE
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The United States already has a group of agencies working together on
employment and labor issues-the Interagency Working Group for the
Consistent Enforcement of Federal Labor, Employment and Immigration
Laws.'90 The group includes the EEOC, DOL, DHS, DOJ, and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board.191 Its purpose is to "promote effective en-
forcement of federal labor, employment, and immigration laws" and "to
identify policies and procedures that promote the consistent enforcement
of those laws and protect all workers in the U.S."1 92 To help the United
States better achieve regulatory coherence with respect to its obligations
under trade agreements, the working group could add that to its regular
agenda.
Relatedly, the Trade Policy Staff Committee and the Trade Policy Re-
view Group does not include the EEOC.193 Now that eliminating discrim-
ination in employment is one of the United States' trade goals, it would
make sense to include the EEOC. The EEOC could provide expertise and
knowledge to the committee. It could also help identify gaps in U.S. en-
forcement of employment discrimination laws and help achieve regulatory
coherence.
Further, the submission process could lead U.S. agencies to exercise
their prosecutorial discretion to protect rather than prosecute workers
whose employers have subjected them to discrimination. When agencies
conflict in their treatment of noncitizen workers, the agencies often are
making different decisions about how to exercise their prosecutorial dis-
cretion.194 Looking to the Durrett Cheese case as an example, there, the
DHS and DOJ made different prosecutorial decisions about whether the
(June 25, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/departments-justice-labor-and-homeland-security-
announce-phase-ii-anti-trafficking [https:/perma.cc/33FB-GTW5] (describing successful partner-
ships with local law enforcement agencies and NGOs that led to an increased number of trafficking
cases filed, and an increased number of defendants charged and prosecuted for trafficking crimes).
190. Fact Sheet: Establishment of Interagency Working Group for the Consistent Enforcement
of Federal Labor, Employment and Immigration Laws, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/




193. Executive Branch Agencies on the Trade Policy Staff Committee and the Trade Policy Re-
view Group, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/about-us/ex-
ecutive-branch-agencies-trade-policy-staff-committee-and-trade-policy-review-group
[https://perma.cc/M2BL-F9L4] (last visited Oct. 6, 2018).
194. Morrison, Executive Estoppel, supra note 1, at 323-28 (arguing that the structural limits of
prosecutorial discretion, internal agency guidelines r garding prosecutorial discretion, and ethical
guidelines all support the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to protect not prosecute unauthorized
workers subjected to employer's violations of anti-discrimination and labor laws).
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workers were victims or perpetrators.'95 On the one hand, DHS deter-
mined the workers were the victims of a crime and so exercised its discre-
tion to not prosecute the workers, and instead sign off on a visa for the
workers.196 On the other hand, DOJ determined the workers were the per-
petrators of a crime and so exercised its prosecutorial discretion to crimi-
nally charge the workers.197
Although congressional intent, internal guidelines, and prosecutorial
ethics suggest that the DOJ's decision to prosecute the workers was un-
warranted,'98 the United States' obligations in trade agreements could have
provided additional reasons for the DOJ to exercise its prosecutorial dis-
cretion consistent with DHS's exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Work-
ers and their advocates could point not only to existing protections under
U.S. law, but also to the provisions in free trade agreements that require
the United States to "ensure that persons with a recognised interest under
its law . . . have appropriate access to impartial and independent ribunals
for the enforcement of [its] labour laws."'99 When U.S. agencies fail to
protect, and instead prosecute, workers when they complain about work-
place discrimination, it denies those workers appropriate access to tribu-
nals for the enforcement of the workers' right to be free from a discrimi-
natory workplace.20 0 Thus, the provisions in the trade agreement could
lead agencies to exercise favorably their prosecutorial discretion and better
coordinate their treatment of noncitizen workers.
Trade agreements also provide an opportunity to fill-in gaps caused
by jurisdictional issues. Where bad actors or recruiters abroad could es-
cape liability, the United States could use the enforcement measures in
trade agreements to achieve remedy. This would apply only in situations
where the country in which the bad actor is located is a party to the agree-
ment. The party would also have to fail to enforce its own labor laws in a
manner that affects trade.
Using Global Horizons as an example, had a trade agreement existed
between the United States and Thailand that included an anti-discrimina-
tion provision, the United States may have been able to demonstrate that
Thailand violated it by allowing recruiters to operate in ways that violated
195. See Mercer, supra note 31.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. Morrison, Executive Estoppel, supra note 1, at 323-28.
199. TPP Full Text, supra note 101, at art. 19.8(2).
200. Morrison, Executive Estoppel, supra note 1, at 322 (demonstrating that U.S. agency prose-
cution of unauthorized workers in abusive workplaces results in those workers being unable to assert
their workplace rights).
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the anti-discrimination provisions of the free trade agreement.2 0' Although
this would not benefit the workers directly, it provides an opportunity to
reinforce migrant workers' rights and prevent future workers from being
victimized by actors who otherwise would escape prosecution or liability.
The final gap that the labor provisions may help fill is that of access
to courts for victims of discrimination. To the extent that effective en-
forcement of Title VII requires access to remedy in federal courts, barring
noncitizen victims of discrimination from that access would violate the
United States' obligation to effectively enforce its labor laws.20 2 As noted
above, many victims of discrimination in the United States cannot get ac-
cess to courts to enforce their rights.2 03
Bringing the United States into compliance with this provision could
motivate Congress to pass legislation that address the barriers to access. It
could also motivate federal agencies to seek remedy on behalf of victims
of discrimination. For example, the EEOC could fill in this gap. The
EEOC sets a five-year strategic enforcement plan in which it identifies
priorities for enforcement.204 The EEOC could include as a priority the
enforcement of systemic discrimination cases involving noncitizen work-
ers in an industry that affects trade. And because the EEOC enjoys proce-
dural and other advantages in litigation that private plaintiffs do not,205 it
will not face the same challenges in accessing courts that this article de-
scribed above.2 06
2. Additional Incentives for the United States to Enforce Existing
Worker Protections
Trade agreements with an enforceable anti-discrimination provision
also will incentivize U.S. agencies to enforce the rights of noncitizen
workers. Kimberly A. Nolan Garcia points out that "[s]tates may strive to
protect labor rights not because they value them intrinsically, but because
they are concerned with how labor rights violations may affect their trade
201. See supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
202. See Morrison, Executive Estoppel, supra note 1, at 303-11 (arguing that Title VII requires
victims of discrimination have access to courts and remedy to be effective because it relies on the
"private attorneys general" to enforce its provisions).
203. See discussion supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
204. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN: FISCAL
YEARS 2018-2022 (2018), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/strategicplan_18-22.cfm [https://perma.
cc/P7ZT-5BG2].
205. Morrison, EEOC as Fist, supra note 1, at 130-33, 144-48 (describing advantages the EEOC
enjoys in bringing systemic/pattern or practice claims-namely, procedural advantages and its exper-
tise and capacity in handling Title VII claims).
206. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
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relations with other nations."2 07 Additionally, the United States' trading
partners have reason to enforce the United States' obligations, especially
with respect to noncitizen workers, because of the comparative advantage
the United States experiences in industries that employ noncitizens.
Free trade agreements negotiated pursuant to the 2015 trade promotion
authority make the employment discrimination provisions subject to the
same dispute settlement provisions as the other trade obligations. As a
result, a trade agreement can provide additional incentives for the United
States to enforce noncitizen workers' rights. Unlike the NAALC, agree-
ments under the 2015 trade promotion authority subject the United States
to trade sanctions or fines if the United States fails to effectively enforce
its own anti-discrimination laws in a manner that affects trade or develop-
ment.208
Moreover, the United States' trade partners may see an advantage in
bringing a complaint against the United States. Although some of the in-
dustries in which noncitizens work may not affect trade or development,209
many of the industries in which noncitizens work affect trade and devel-
opment and are ones in which the United States enjoys a comparative trade
advantage. Further, those industries are ones in which there have been
many reports of worker abuse.
A comparative trade advantage exists when a country is able to more
efficiently produce a good than another country.2 10 If the opportunity
costs, "how much output of good Y must be forgone to produce one more
unit of good X[,] . . . are different in each economy, then each country has
a comparative advantage in the production of one of the goods."2 11 A
country will experience a comparative advantage when it makes "intensive
207. Kimberly A. Nolan Garcia, Transnational Advocates and Labor Rights Enforcement in the
North American Free Trade Agreement, 53 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC'Y 29, 36 (2011).
208. The TPP provides an example of what the dispute settlement process would look like. After
parties engage in formal consultations, the complaining party may request that a panel hear the dispute
under the dispute settlement provisions. TPP Full Text, supra note 101, at Ch. 28.7(1). The panel
issues an initial report to which the parties may respond. Id. at art. 28.17(3)-(8). After the panel
presents the initial report, the panel issues a final report and must release it to the public. Id. at art.
28.18(1)-(2). If the panel finds the party did not meet its obligations under the TPP, then the party
must eliminate the non-conformity. See id. at art. 28.19. Where a party fails to eliminate the non-
conformity, the complaining party may suspend benefits under the agreement. Id. at art. 28.20(2)-(3).
The non-conforming party may elect to pay a fine if it cannot or will not eliminate the non-conformity.
Id. at art. 28.20(10). Thus, under the TPP, the United States would face trade sanctions or fines if it
failed to enforce the rights of noncitizen workers under federal anti-discrimination laws.
209. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
210. WAYNE M. MORRISON ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33944, U.S. TRADE CONCEPTS,
PERFORMANCE, AND POLICY: FAQS 1-2 (2015) (summarizing the nineteenth century economist, Da-
vid Ricardo's, conceptualization of comparative advantage).
211. Id. at 1-2 (emphases omitted).
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use of the country's relatively abundant factor(s) of production."2 12 Those
factors include "land, labor, physical capital (plant and equipment), human
capital (skills and knowledge including entrepreneurial talent), and tech-
nology." 213  Governments can manipulate comparative advantage indi-
rectly by "compensating for some form of market failure" not aimed at any
particular industry or directly by promoting or using measures to protect
specific industries.214
The United States enjoys a comparative advantage for many agricul-
tural products under current free trade agreements.215 Among the products
are soybeans, corn, tree nuts, cotton, pork, and poultry.2 16 Because of
NAFTA, the United States enjoys a comparative advantage with Mexico
for poultry products, pork products, apples, and pears.217 The advantage
is driven, in part, by the United States' amount of arable land, the United
States' transportation infrastructure, the United States' technology-in-
cluding refrigeration capacity, and the United States' financial system.2 18
But an overlooked factor may be the agricultural and food manufac-
turing industry's use of noncitizen workers. Unauthorized workers repre-
sent 18% of agricultural workers and 13% of food manufacturing work-
ers.219 Immigrant workers-workers who are noncitizen and authorized-
make up 15% of agricultural workers and 17% of food manufacturing
workers.220 And as described above, many of the reports of abusive work
environments involve precisely those industries.22'
"[E]ach country can realize gains from trade by specializing in pro-
ducing what it does relatively well and in which it has a comparative ad-
vantage and trading for what it does relatively less well and in which it has
a comparative disadvantage."222 To the extent that agricultural and food
212. Id at 2.
213. Id
214. Id
215. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., TRADE AGREEMENTS AND U.S.
AGRICULTURE 2-3 (2014), https://www.usda.gov/oce/economics/papers/WhitePaper0 12 14_Trade-
AgreemeTra.pdf [https://perma.cc/D85R-77MS]; see also FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRIC., FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND U.S. AGRICULTURE 3-4 (2016), https://www.fas.usda.gov
/sites/default/files/2016-06/2016-06_iatr ftas.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Y8C-DLF8] (concluding U.S.
exports are much more competitive in countries with which the United States has a trade agreement).
216. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, supra note 215, at 4.
217. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., supra note 215, at 2-3.
218. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, supra note 215.
219. DeSilver, supra note 165.
220. Id
221. See supra notes 13-15.
222. MORRISON ET AL., supra note 210, at 2.
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manufacturing employers hire noncitizen workers to gain market ad-
vantages, the United States' failure to enforce the workplace rights may
represent a direct intervention by the United States to manipulate its com-
parative advantage. As a result, the United States' trading partners would
be likely to complain under a trade agreement, particularly where it creates
a comparative disadvantage for the complaining country.
Finally, even though the United States has incentives under trade
agreements to enforce its laws protecting noncitizen workers, the misa-
lignment in interests between the United States and employers, described
above, may pose an obstacle.223 Pass-through regulations could remedy
that obstacle.2 24 The United States could enact pass-through regulations
that fine employers whose workplace practices result in the United States
receiving a fine under a trade agreement.225 In sum, trade agreements pro-
vide incentives for the United States to enforce its own anti-discrimination
laws with respect to noncitizen workers and the ability to address any ob-
stacles to its enforcement of those laws.
3. Create Political Pressure on U.S. Agencies to Enforce Anti-
Discrimination Laws and a Source of Framing to Pressure Employers
to Change Their Conduct
Enforceable anti-discrimination provisions in trade agreements also
provide an opportunity to workers and their advocates. First, the public
submission process provides a mechanism through which workers can put
political pressure on U.S. agencies to better enforce noncitizen workers'
right to be free from discrimination in the workplace. Second, the provi-
sions provide an organizational tool for activists to frame noncitizens'
workplace rights as human rights and respect for the rule of law. In this
way, activists can change the narrative around noncitizen workers and
place pressure on employers to change their behavior.
a. Pressure on U.S. Agencies
The public submission provisions provide an opportunity for non-gov-
ernmental organizations to put pressure on United States agencies when
they do not adequately enforce anti-discrimination laws, even where the
violation does not result in dispute settlement and the attendant fines and
223. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
224. Polaski, supra note 91, at 23.
225. Id.
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226sanctions. This can result not only in remedial action because the gov-
ernment desires to avoid potential fines or sanctions, but also in preventa-
227tive action. Further, the submission process could lead U.S. agencies to
exercise their prosecutorial discretion to protect rather than prosecute
workers whose employers have subjected them to discrimination. Accord-
ingly, when advocates effectively use the public submission process under
free trade agreements, free trade agreements can lead to better protections
for noncitizen workers, even in the absence of enforcement under the
agreement.
The political scientist Jonathan Graubart looked at the use of the sub-
mittal process under NAALC and determined that despite the lack of
strong enforcement mechanisms, activists were successful in achieving
domestic political gain in the United States, Canada, and Mexico.2 28 For
example, in 1998, a group of noncitizen workers in the Washington apple
industry and their advocates filed a submission with Mexico that alleged
that employers in the industry routinely violated noncitizen workers'
rights with respect to freedom of association and organization, collective
bargaining, non-discrimination, a workplace free of occupational injuries
and illnesses, compensation for occupational injuries and illnesses, and
protection of migrant workers.2 29 The workers argued the United States
failed to enforce its workplace laws against the employers, and so violated
its obligations under NAALC. 230 Mexico issued a report and requested
consultation.23 ' The consultation resulted in an agreement by the Depart-
ment of Labor to engage in outreach efforts to educate noncitizen workers
about their workplace rights, and to host public information sessions that
received comments from the public about how to better enforce the rights
226. Id. at 24 (describing successful efforts on the part of NGOs who used the submission process
under NAALC to draw attention to the plight of female workers in Mexican factories who faced preg-
nancy discrimination).
227. Id.
228. Jonathan Graubart, "Politicizing" a New Breed of "Legalized" Transnational Political Op-
portunity Structures: Labor Activists Uses of NAFTA's Citizen-Petition Mechanism, 26 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 97, 132-37 (2005).
229. Apple Growers, Violations Of NAALC Labor Principles And Obligations In The Washing-
ton State Apple Industry Submission, Mex. NAO 9802, at 1 (n.d.) (unofficial translation),
https://www.dol.gov/ilab/submissions/pdf/mx_9802 apple growers_submissios.pdf [https://perma.
cc/T7FY-6U6P]; see also Compa, supra note 49, at 235 (describing submission and process to bring
attention to the submission).
230. Apple Growers, Violations Of NAALC Labor Principles And Obligations In The Washing-
ton State Apple Industry Submission, Mex. NAO 9802, at 1 (n.d.) (unofficial translation),
https://www.dol.gov/ilab/submissions/pdf/mx_9802 apple growers_submission.pdf [https://perma.
cc/BRQ8-VG6D].
231. Mex. NAO 9802, Apple Growers, Report (Aug. 1999), https://www.dol.gov/ilab/re-
ports/pdf/mx 9802 apple growers report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BTD-D3AR].
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of noncitizen workers.232 "On the ground, it led to improvements in hous-
ing conditions, piecework rate calculations, and health and safety enforce-
ment."233
Public submissions, then, can result in "information exchange and
technical assistance" from the government, such as educational sessions
or rights campaigns.23 4 This gives "leverage" to transnational groups and
"compels states to accept the normative arguments presented by advocates
and to commit to stronger labor rights enforcement."235
Graubart's study of NAALC's public submission process also showed
that a complaint was more likely to result in "positive change" for workers
when the recipient government directed political attention to the com-
plaint, and the complaint was submitted by transnational organizations.236
This suggests that workers and their advocates should not only draw the
recipient government's attention to the submission, but they also should
reach out across borders to create the movement. Public submissions un-
der trade agreements provide an opportunity for noncitizen workers to put
political pressure on U.S. agencies to enforce their rights and to engage in
measures to prevent employers from violating worker rights.
b. Frame for a Social Movement to Pressure Employers
Free trade agreements that incorporate workplace protections have the
promise of creating a new narrative about noncitizen workers-one in
which workers are human beings with fundamental human rights regard-
less of their immigration status.23 7 The inclusion of anti-discrimination
provisions, means that trade agreements can become a frame to broaden
the number of people who support workplace rights for noncitizen workers
in the United States.238 The frame can, in turn, create vulnerabilities within
232. Mex. NAO 9802, Apple Growers, Ministerial Consultations - Mexico Submissions 9801,
9802 and 9803 (May 18, 2000), https://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/minagreemt9801-9802-
9803.htm [https:/perma.cc/Y6MT-LQKS].
233. Compa, supra note 49, at 235.
234. Polaski, supra note 91, at 24.
235. Garcia, supra note 207.
236. INT'L LABOUR ORG., SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 49-50 (2013) (cit-
ing Garcia, supra note 207, at 29-60).
237. Cf Lyon, supra note 65, at 495 (arguing that a ratification debate on the U.N. Convention
on Migrant Worker Rights would "expos[e] more U.S. citizens to the notion that immigrant workers
are the subject of a human rights treaty" and thus "help to shift the political climate toward policy
reform").
238. Ruben J. Garcia, Transnationalism as a Social Movement Strategy: Institutions, Actors and
International Labor Standards, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 2-3 (2003) ("Frames provide a
way to look at an issue that is intended to broaden the number of people who support the goals of a
social movement.").
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the current, dominant narrative surrounding noncitizen workers, and create
an opportunity to convert that narrative. With a new narrative, advocates
can use public submissions and other tools to link specific employers to
the systemic problem of exploiting noncitizen workers.239 Thus, even in
the absence of real remedies or enforcement, advocates can harness the
worker rights standards in trade agreements to build a social movement
that results in pressure on companies that discriminate against employ-
ees.240
There are two different types of framing for which free trade agree-
ments could prove useful. The first type of frame has to do with how pro-
ponents of particular policies communicate the reason the public should
support the policy. These are called value frames. A value frame "draws
'an association between a value and an issue that carries an evaluative im-
plication: it presents one position on an issue as being right (and others
wrong) by linking that position to a specific core value."'24 1 Proponents
and opponents of a particular policy outcome may use the same value to
frame the issue.242 A benefit of value framing is that it can "help to pro-
mote shared frames of reference for understanding issues."243 The hope is
that the shared frame of reference results in "more effective deliberation"
about policy choices.244 The role that value framing has on public policy
choices means that when social movement actors engage in the framing
process, they must consider which values will most effectively "inspire
and legitimate" their campaign.245
The second has to do with the process that social movement actors use
to "inspire and legitimate [their] activities and campaigns."24 6 In this re-
spect, a frame is an "action-oriented set[] of beliefs and meanings."24 7
239. See Tim Bartley & Curtis Child, Shaming the Corporation: The Social Production of Tar-
gets and the Anti-Sweatshop Movement, 79 AM. SOC. REV. 653, 656 (2014) (describing how social
movements identify targets for advocacy).
240. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 11, at 507 (arguing advocates can use international labor stand-
ards "to induce corporate compliance with core international labor rights, even in the absence of strong
national or local level enforcement.").
241. Paul R. Brewer & Kimberly Gross, Values, Framing, and Citizens' Thoughts about Policy
Issues: Effects on Content and Quantity, 26 POL. PSYCHOL. 929, 931 (2005) (quoting Paul R. Brewer,
Value Words and Lizard Brains: Do Citizens Deliberate About Appeals to Their Core Values?, 22
POL. PSYCHOL. 45, 46 (2001)).
242. Id. at 930-31.
243. Id. at 944.
244. Id.
245. Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Over-





Movement actors construct frames by identifying a situation in need of
change and attribute blame (diagnostic framing), set out an alternative
(prognostic framing), and "urge others to act in concert to affect change
[motivational framing]."248
Two potential value frames presented by free trade agreements are that
of human rights and the rule of law. Scholars and advocates have looked
to international human rights tandards as a frame for arguing that noncit-
izen workers deserve workplace protections regardless of immigration sta-
tus.249 For example, Lance Compa has argued that advocates should refer
to international human rights when advocating for noncitizen workers.25 0
In particular, he maintains that advocates should look to UN and ILO con-
ventions to "frame[] advocacy as a human rights mission, not defending
'illegal aliens."'251' But the United States has not ratified most of the ILO's
worker rights conventions; it has only ratified the Abolition of Forced La-
bor Convention25 2 and the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention.253 As
Compa and others have noted, the United States is unlikely to ratify those
conventions.254 In the absence of U.S. ratification of the ILO anti-discrim-
ination convention,25 5 the inclusion of the anti-discrimination provisions
in trade agreements can help to normalize the human rights expressed in
the ILO conventions.256
The inclusion of workers' rights in free trade agreements also could
draw an association between honoring oncitizen workers' rights and the
248. Id. at 615.
249. See, e.g., Lyon, supra note 65; Compa, supra note 49.
250. Compa, supra note 49, at 239-42.
251. Id. at 242.
252. Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291.
253. Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161. Of course,
as Beth Lyon has argued, noncitizen workers in the United States would be even better protected if
the United States ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of their Families. See Lyon, supra note 65.
254. See Compa, supra note 49, at 219-21, 239-40 (summarizing the literature). Beth Lyon has
noted that one of the barriers to achieving United States' ratification of the UN's Convention on Mi-
grant Workers is that "any attempt to define immigrants as rights holders is a political non-starter."
Lyon, supra note 65, at 419.
255. Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation Convention (No.
111), June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31.
256. Lance Compa also notes advocates' "creative use" of the submission process in NAALC to
assert migrant worker protections as yielding "concrete positive results." Compa, supra note 49, at
234. Another advantage of including the ILO fundamental rights in trade agreements is that it avoids
the lengthy process otherwise required for ratification of international conventions. For example, Beth
Lyon describes a ten-step process for modern multi-lateral treaty making. Lyon, supra note 65, at
403-04 (citing CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE: A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE 8-9 (Comm. Print 2001)).
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rule of law. First, that free trade agreements create an obligation on the
part of the United States to effectively enforce its own labor laws, allows
workers to call on the core value of respect for the rule of law to insist the
United States reinforce their workplace rights. Second, that the provision
is enforceable through both formal consultation and eventual resort to the
dispute settlement process also taps into rule of law values because it le-
gitimizes the enforcement of noncitizens workers' rights. Graubart has
noted the role that even a quasi-judicial mechanism, such as the formal
consultation process, has because it "incorporates the particular legitimat-
ing power of law in encouraging norm-based behavior."25 7 A new frame-
one that emphasizes the human rights of noncitizen workers and the United
States' obligation to enforce those rights-undermines the narrative that
immigration restrictionists have created about noncitizen workers as a
threat and criminal.258 Social scientists have found that this type of re-
framing of an issue can mitigate the effects of the initial frame.25 9 Thus,
the anti-discrimination provisions in free trade agreements can provide a
link between the core values of human rights and respect for the rule of
law and the enforcement of noncitizens' workplace rights.
In turn, social movement actors can use the value frames to construct
a movement that puts pressure on employers, especially multinational en-
terprises, to change their treatment of noncitizen workers. First, both rule
of law and human rights provide a way for activists to engage in diagnostic
framing. Advocates can point to employers' exploitation of the under-
enforcement of noncitizens' workplace rights as violating human rights
and rule of law norms.260 Several non-governmental organizations in the
United States have already explored and reported on the various ways that
employers have violated noncitizen workers' workplace rights.2 6 ' Few
257. Graubart, supra note 228, at 103.
258. See discussion supra Part I.B.
259. Brewer & Gross, supra note 241, at 931, 943.
260. Diagnostic framing often involves "injustice frames" whereby movements "identify the
'victims' of a given injustice and amplify their victimization." Benford & Snow, supra note 245, at
615.
261. See, e.g., Khokha, supra note 15 (describing sexual assault of female, noncitizen agricultural
workers who lacking status were afraid to report); Frontline: Rape on the Night Shift, supra note 15
(reporting on workplace sexual assaults of female, noncitizen custodial workers); BAUER& RAMIREZ,
supra note 13, at 41-47 (summarizing interviews with noncitizen, female workers in the agricultural
and meat processing industry). S. POVERTY L. CTR. & ALA. APPLESEED CNT. FOR LAW & JUSTICE,
supra note 14 (describing results of surveys and interviews with workers in the Alabama Poultry In-
dustry who reported receiving more dangerous and undesirable work assignments because of their
national origin; workers also reported national origin harassment from coworkers). See also Rebecca
Smith et al., Iced Out: How Immigration Enforcement Has Interfered with Workers'Rights, AFL-CIO
15-29 (2009), https:/digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&contexc=la-
borunions [https://perma.cc/TD6F-5FPW] (describing instances where workers reported workplace
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have looked explicitly at how that treatment violates human rights law and
the rule of law.2 62 Using the anti-discrimination provisions in free trade
agreements to illustrate both the human rights and rule of law frames,
would provide the hook for activists to link specific employers to the prob-
lem.
Second, the worker rights provisions set out an alternative to the cur-
rent, problematic treatment of noncitizen workers. This prognostic fram-
ing would allow social movement actors to show a different way of think-
ing about government enforcement of noncitizen rights-the non-
enforcement is reframed as a threat to trade that undermines the rule of
law, and the enforcement is reframed as necessary to upholding basic hu-
man rights values and respecting the rule of law. Finally, the worker rights
provisions could also assist in activists' motivational framing of the issue.
The enforceability of the provisions provides hope to activists that their
collective efforts could result in change.26 3
Accordingly, the framing could change public opinion and, therefore,
pressure employers to change their behavior. Social movements can ad-
dress systemic problems, in part, because they "link[] particular actors to
systemic problems" and draw attention to those actors through public in-
formation.264 Employers that are also multinational companies can make
good targets for focused action because market- based concerns drive their
decision-making and they can be more nimble in responding to social con-
cerns than state actors.265 For example, multinational companies may seek
"to preserve their eputations and maintain market positions in the face of
globalizing markets."26 6 As a result, over the last three decades, private
actors have started to "incorporate[] international labor norms into private
contracts and other instruments, such as industry codes of conduct, inter-
violations and then were put into removal proceedings by ICE); Workers on the Front Lines, POWER
CAMPAIGN, http://thepoweract.org/worker-stories [https:/perma.cc/WE45-E9EV] (last visited Oct. 9,
2018) (worker narratives describing workers who have been caught up in ICE raids of abusive em-
ployers and then placed in removal proceedings).
262. A recent report looked at the working conditions of casino and hotel workers in Las Vegas,
Nevada and described how the working conditions did not comport with international human rights
standards. FATMA E. MAROUF ET AL., BANKING ON UNSAFE WORKING CONDITIONS: PLACING PROF-
ITS BEFORE PROTECTION OF CASINO & HOTEL WORKERS' HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEUTSCHE BANK'S U.S.
SUPPLY CHAIN (2016), https://www.law.uci.edu/academics/real-life-learning/clinics/pdfs/Banking-
on-Unsafe-Working-Conditions-05-17-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/NFF3-JH9A].
263. Benford & Snow, supra note 245, at 617 ("Motivational framing, the final core framing task,
provides a 'call to arms' or rationale for engaging in ameliorative collective action . . .
264. Bartley & Child, supra note 239.
265. Tim Bartley, Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of Transnational
Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions, 113 AM. J. SOC. 297, 298-99 (2007).
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national framework collective agreements, and corporate social responsi-
bility measures."267 Thus, to the extent that free trade agreements prove a
useful tool in reframing the negative narrative about noncitizens and fram-
ing social movements that promote workers' rights, they will also prove a
useful tool to pressure companies to change their behavior.
CONCLUSION
Employer exploitation of noncitizen workers remains a persistent
problem. U.S. agencies treat workers inconsistently based on the workers'
transnational status, resulting in gaps in enforcement. Similarly, bad ac-
tors may escape prosecution for engaging in workplace abuses because
they are outside of the United States' jurisdiction. And victims of systemic
discrimination have increasingly experienced a lack of access to courts to
enforce their rights.
This article has explored the ways in which labor protections in free
trade agreements can solve some of those persistent problems and rein-
force the rights of noncitizen workers. Because trade promotion authority
and free trade agreements have included the elimination of employment
discrimination and the promotion of regulatory coherence among their
measures, free trade agreements provide three main opportunities to
noncitizen workers.
First, the provisions can fill in gaps in U.S. enforcement of workplace
provisions for noncitizen workers. To comply with the trade agreements,
U.S. agencies need to work together to consistently enforce noncitizens'
employment rights. The provisions also provide a way for agencies to
reach bad actors who would otherwise be outside of the agencies' jurisdic-
tion. Second, the United States has additional incentives to enforce anti-
discrimination laws because it could face fines or sanctions under trade
agreements, if it does not.
Finally, the employment provisions in free trade agreements are an
additional source of pressure for advocacy campaigns. Through the public
submission process, advocates can use free trade agreements to pressure
U.S. agencies to enforce workers' rights, even in the absence of real en-
forcement under the trade agreement. Workers can also use free trade
agreements as an organizational tool to frame a social movement that rec-
ognizes workers as having independent human rights, and that recognizes
the enforcement of those rights as respect for the rule of law.
267. Weiss, supra note 11, at 500.
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